Staff

Managing Editor
Troy Sherman

Editorial Board
Andrew Aulthouse
Claire Cathro
Adriana Gonzalez
Jessica Grys
Lucia Guerrero
Mark Henderson
Steven Patterson
Prabhjot Sidhu

Copy Editors
Daisy Kling
Meghan Harris

Layout Editor
Veronica Saroli

Management Board
Wudassie Semaneh-Tamrat,
Workshops & Lectures Coordinator

Michael Oshell,
Student Liaison

Kim Woollett,
Marketing Director

Alex Thomson,
Finance Director

Copyright © 2014 Politicus Journal. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of Politicus Journal. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or Queen’s University.

Cover by Kim Woollett

www.politucusjournal.com
Editor’s Letter

After almost a yearlong process, I am proud to present the first volume of Politicus Journal! This is a new undergraduate journal focusing on political and international affairs. We have the distinct pleasure of publishing six exceptional articles by students at Queen’s University. These articles complement our exciting and engaging public lecture series that attracted over 500 students throughout the year.

None of this would have been possible, however, without the help of so many people. I must first thank my Management Board and Editorial Board, who have been nothing short of exceptional throughout this entire process. Their work and dedication to Politicus is why we were so successful this year. It is not easy to dedicate time and effort to this initiative on top of one’s schoolwork, particularly seeing as it was its inaugural year. I would like to thank them all, from the bottom of my heart, for taking a leap of faith with me. Your patience, passion, and unwavering dedication have made this possible.

I would also like to thank the Arts & Science Undergraduate Society and the Office of the Vice-Principal (Research). Their support and encouragement this year allowed us to put on such a vibrant lecture series and publish this exceptional first volume of Politicus. In particular, I would like to thank Irfan Tahiri, Scott Mason, Adam Grotsky, Vice-Principal Steven Liss, Dr. Yolande Chan, Dr. Cynthia Fekken, and Melinda Knox, without whom there would be no Politicus.

To our distinguished Panel of Referees, a sincere thank you is in order. We have 20 professors from two universities, who were able to referee over 30 submissions from students. The overwhelming support Politicus has received from the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s, the Department of Development Studies at Queen’s and the Department of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, allowed undergraduate students go through a unique, double-blind review process. I would like to specifically recognize Dr. Grant Amyot and Dr. Marc Epprecht, who were champions of Politicus from the very first day I met with them to get support from their respective departments.

Finally, I would like to thank you, the students, who are at the very heart of Politicus. The idea behind Politicus was to offer students a forum for a free exchange of ideas around topical, and often controversial, subjects in political and international affairs. I am convinced that we were successful in this endeavour. Our five public lectures, in addition to over 30 submissions we received for publication in this journal, are a clear indication that undergraduate students are willing and able to engage in the great debates of our time. To those students, I have but one thing to say: Cha Gheill!

All the best,

Troy Sherman
Founder and Managing Editor, 2013-2014
# Contents

The Legacy of Canadian Colonialism: The Case of Violence Against Aboriginal Women  
*Zoe Share*

HIV Prevention through Empowerment: An Assessment of the Shifting Trends in Anti-HIV Frameworks and Program Priorities of Health Interventions in Indian Female Sex Workers (FSW) Communities from 1992 Onwards.  
*Ali Tejpar*

The Big Picture: Colonial Legacy and the Evolution of Electoral Formula Choice in Africa  
*Brandon Pasternak*

Consociational Democracy in Afghanistan with Lessons from Northern Ireland  
*Irfan Tahiri*

Smart Aid: Innovating the Concept of Development  
*Ali Tejpar*

From the Polls to the Streets: Disaffection and Extra-Democratic Participation in Latin America  
*Brandon Pasternak*
The Legacy of Canadian Colonialism: The Case of Violence against Aboriginal Women

Zoe Share

The shocking number of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada has resulted in new popularity on the subject of this minority group, and has even been recognized at the international level. The violence perpetrated against these women can be traced back to the beginning of Canadian colonization. European settlers initiated the marginalization of Aboriginal women, a phenomenon which continues to this day and leaves these women extremely vulnerable to acts of violence. This paper analyzes the systematic oppression of Aboriginal women in Canada throughout history, within the contexts of colonialism and neocolonialism. It is argued that this marginalization of Aboriginal women, beginning with colonization, has resulted in extreme and disproportionate violence against them. Only when this historical present is acknowledged can appropriate action be taken to bring these women out of the periphery of Canadian society.

The legacy of colonialism in Canada is seen in many aspects of daily life. The issue of violence against Aboriginal women, in light of recent disappearances and murders, has highlighted this. Many Canadians may wonder why Aboriginal women have become targets for excessive acts of violence; others are quick to jump to conclusions based on victim-blaming. What Canadians should be asking instead is: what is the root of the problem? The adverse and unequal treatment bestowed upon Aboriginal women is not something new, but is, in fact, embedded within the nation’s long colonial history. By examining colonial policies, dating back to first contact, it is evident that Aboriginal women have been systematically marginalized. An analysis of the position of Aboriginal women in modern Canadian society is even more revealing, as it exposes gendered and racialized discrimination resulting in vulnerability to violence. Finally, reactions to violence in the form of missing or murdered Aboriginal women in Canada will be considered as possible expressions of neocolonialism — stereotypes that persist despite the abandonment of colonial policies — indicating the need for solutions. By analyzing Aboriginal women in Canada within the contexts set out above, this paper will argue that colonialism in Canada has severely marginalized Aboriginal women, resulting in extreme and disproportionate violence against them.

Zoe Share is a second year student studying Development Studies at Queen’s University.
The governmental policies implemented in early colonial times, many of which lasted well into the twentieth century, effectively created a marginalized group of aboriginal women. The impacts of these policies are still endured by Aboriginal women today and directly relate to their increased exposure to violence. For the purpose of this essay, marginalization will be defined as the treatment of a person or group of people as insignificant or peripheral.¹

In traditional Aboriginal communities, men and women held mutual respect for one another and enjoyed equal rights. This is demonstrated in the film, *Cree Hunters of Mistassini*, in which both the men and women share the responsibility of ensuring the livability of their winter camp and that their families are taken care of.² While men and women in traditional Aboriginal life were expected to complete specific tasks dependent on their gender, both were seen as equally important: there was no competition between the sexes.³ This Aboriginal male-female dynamic drastically changed with the arrival of European settlers, who held much different views regarding men and women. The rise of the fur trade led to the formation of new class relations and initiated a dependency of Aboriginal women on Aboriginal men, who were given the role of commodity producers by the settlers.⁴ By conferring Aboriginal men with this more desirable role (that is, desirable in the eyes of European mercantilist settlers), the ‘different but equal’ mentality held by Aboriginal men and women was put under pressure, and Aboriginal women began to feel the effects.

As Aboriginal land continued to be colonized, the marginalization of Aboriginal women also intensified. European settlers brought with them many things from their home, most notably, their dominant ideologies. For most of the official colonization period in Canada, Aboriginal people were considered inferior and uncivilized in comparison to their settler counterparts. With this in mind, settlers sought to establish their ‘superior’ and ‘civiližed’ worldviews through legislation and policy. Legislation with “origins in Victorian ideas of race and patriarchy”⁵ came face to face with conventional Aboriginal values of equality. This had a significant impact on Aboriginal people, and especially on Aboriginal women. Culhane explains that “European patriarchal values and structures were superimposed on Indigenous societies, displacing women from the positions of respect they held traditionally.”⁶ Aboriginal women were denied their positions in community life. *The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* also concludes that European settlers, including the Jesuits, condemned the political and ceremonial power held by Aboriginal women and aimed to increase male control within Aboriginal
It is evident that the marginalization of Aboriginal women by European settlers was deliberate. The effects of these pursuits distinguished Aboriginal women as the most socially excluded group in Canada, establishing the circumstances for disproportionate violence against them.

One example of colonial legislation, perhaps the most infamous, is the *Indian Act* of 1867. Creating a divide between Aboriginal men and women, in which Aboriginal women did not hold any power, was viewed as a “necessary precondition” to colonial expansion in Canada. The *Indian Act* institutionalized this patriarchal ideology, ensuring the belittlement of Aboriginal women. European colonial masters asserted definitions for Aboriginal identity, deciding who could and could not be Indian. These definitions “privileged men, and rendered women dependent on their father’s identity if single, and their husband’s if married.” As a piece of colonial legislation, the *Indian Act* fundamentally altered the position of Aboriginal women in their communities, as well as Canadian society as a whole. The most notable illustration of how the *Act* disadvantaged Aboriginal women regards intermarriage between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. While a non-Aboriginal woman could obtain Indian status by marrying an Aboriginal man, the opposite was not true. In fact, if an Aboriginal woman married a non-Aboriginal man, she was stripped of her Indian status and no longer allowed to live on reserve lands. A double standard concerning Aboriginal men and women was established under the *Indian Act*; its restrictions physically separated Aboriginal women from their communities, heightening their marginalization and compelling them to live in unsafe off-reserve areas.

It is also important to note the amendments made to the *Indian Act*, specifically in Bill C-31, in 1985. These amendments were made in response to the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and were intended to eliminate aspects of gender discrimination inherent in the *Act*. Aboriginal women who lost their Indian status because of marriage to a non-Aboriginal man would be able to reclaim their status. Despite these legal changes, Aboriginal women continued to be marginalized; the patriarchal discourse first established by European settlers runs too deep to be dismantled solely by the passing of a bill.

The imposition of colonial policies centuries ago successfully hindered Aboriginal women as a group and resulted in their gendered and racialized discrimination in modern Canadian society. Aboriginal women remain at the periphery in Canada today, especially compared to non-Aboriginal women. This is evident in statistics on highest levels of schooling,
labour force activity and income distribution. Forty-one per cent of Aboriginal females in Canada have no degree, certificate or diploma, compared to 23 per cent of non-Aboriginal females; only 7 per cent of Aboriginal women have a university degree, two and half times less than that of their non-Aboriginal counterparts. This translates to labour force activity accordingly: the unemployment rate for Aboriginal females in 2006 was 14 per cent, more than double the rate of non-Aboriginal females, who were at only 6 per cent. This forms yet another link: income distribution. The average total income of Aboriginal women in 2006 was $21,773, significantly less than the $28,272 received by non-Aboriginal women on average. Interestingly, both groups were well below the average income of Aboriginal males, which was $30,110. These statistics demonstrate the inequality between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, and more specifically, women in Canada. Aboriginal women, on average, enjoy less education, less employment and lower incomes than their non-Aboriginal equivalents. By positioning Aboriginal women on the lowest rung of the settler-patriarchal hierarchy, they are placed in circumstances of poor social and economic standing and therefore are subject to disproportionate amounts of violence.

The marginalization of Aboriginal women is a fact of Canadian life, but what does this mean and how does this transfer to increased violence against these women? The challenges that Aboriginal women face daily, whether based on economics, child welfare, education, the justice and court systems and so on, create vulnerable living situations for many of these women. This vulnerability stems from their gender, race, indigeneity, the dominant colonial narrative, and countless other sources. It is well known that poverty and violence are directly related; with Aboriginal women being overrepresented in impoverished communities they are also overrepresented as victims of violence. Instances of violence are estimated as three times higher for Aboriginal compared to non-Aboriginal women. In a 2009 study, 67,000 Aboriginal women reported being a victim of violence within the past year. This abuse has been occurring for a long time and represents severe and violent behaviour. The Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) has catalogued approximately 600 cases of missing or murdered Aboriginal women spanning the course of decades. According to a 1996 government study, “Aboriginal women are five times more likely to be murdered than any other group of Canadian women.” The continued marginalization of Aboriginal women has exposed them to the most violent crimes in Canada.
As Aboriginal women are tossed to the outskirts of Canadian society, they are forced to take on dangerous forms of work in order to survive. One example of this high-risk work is the sex worker industry. Many Aboriginal women find it hard to obtain employment simply because of their Aboriginal identity. One Aboriginal woman, named Francis, explained that “Once you say you are Indian, you lose your chances for the good jobs in town.” Without adequate jobs, some Aboriginal women are driven into the sex trade as a means of survival. As part of the sex trade, Aboriginal women find themselves socially alienated to an even higher degree, and susceptible to violence in an arena of unreliable police protection. An analysis of sex trade in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside is telling. A study in 2000 suggests that approximately 70 percent of sex workers in the Downtown Eastside are Aboriginal women. Even within Vancouver’s sex trade, these women are worse off than non-Aboriginal workers. Non-Aboriginal women engage in their work in safer areas of the city and often make more money, while Aboriginal women are stuck in the “low tracks,” where the threat of violence is at its highest. The inequality between the already stigmatized group of sex workers demonstrates how deep the practice of disparaging Aboriginal women runs. Further, the shame commonly associated with the sex trade traps Aboriginal women in a vicious cycle of marginalization, in which they are continually pushed to the side and vulnerable to violent acts.

Aboriginal women who partake in the sex trade receive inadequate protection and thus, are susceptible to severe violence. Due to the threat of arrest, sex workers are unlikely to report a violent attack, which only further attracts perpetrators who believe, with good reason, that their crimes will not be punished. In addition, there is a strong feeling of contempt towards sex workers in Canadian society, shared by non-Aboriginal citizens and police personnel alike, who fail to acknowledge the reasons why women resort to the sex trade. By regarding Aboriginal women’s place in the sex trade as merely a lifestyle choice, their history of marginalization and social exclusion, stemming from colonialism, are ignored. These women do not choose to be sex workers from a variety of career opportunities — they do so because it is their only option. This compulsion derives from the systematic belittlement of Aboriginal women, from the colonial period to the present day, and results in unacceptably high rates of violence towards this particular group.
The disregard of colonial connotations associated with violence against Aboriginal women, risks the perpetuation of this neocolonial ideology. That is to say, Aboriginal women will continue to be oppressed, only now by the hegemonic ideas of Canadian society, rather than the overt colonization of the past. This is evident in actions of the police and government officials, media portrayals and reactions of the general public to reports of missing and murdered Aboriginal women. There is a certain level of systemic bias held by some police officers; investigations reflect Aboriginal stereotypes, which are often unintentional and come from popular, yet inaccurate, portrayals of Aboriginal people in Canada.\textsuperscript{29} Investigations into reports of missing Aboriginal women are also frequently characterized by notions of transiency and a lack of urgency among the police.\textsuperscript{30} For example, “in April 1999, there was a move to get police to offer a reward for information leading to the missing [Aboriginal] women, but instead the City of Vancouver suggested offering $5,000 to any of the missing women to come forward.”\textsuperscript{31} By implying that Aboriginal women are not actually missing but have chosen to leave, neocolonial ideas emerge in support of Aboriginal women as the marginalized ‘other’— a social outsider.

Media and news coverage of missing or murdered Aboriginal women continues to support the misconception of these women. Moreover, their pervasive nature acts as a tool to spread the marginal narrative: effectively encouraging an ideology that views Aboriginal women as unimportant, invisible and disposable to mainstream Canadian society. This, in turn, promotes violence against these women. In a study comparing the news coverage of three Aboriginal missing/murdered women with three non-Aboriginal missing/murdered women in Canada, Gilchrist found that the Aboriginal women were underrepresented and that articles pertaining to them were relatively depersonalized and detached in style.\textsuperscript{32} She also noted that stories about the missing Aboriginal women appeared on the front page of newspapers less often,\textsuperscript{33} suggesting that these women are being marginalized even in the sense of article placement on the periphery of print media. Canadian not-for-profit organization, MediaSmarts, reports that missing or murdered Aboriginal women receive less media attention, and they are subject to either critically biased and less sympathetic reporting or blatant denial.\textsuperscript{34} The positioning of Aboriginal women at the perimeter of Canadian news by media outlets is reminiscent of the disparaging nature of governmental policy in the colonial era; both promote Aboriginal women as undeserving of attention and set them up to become victims of violence — the media has simply adapted, becoming less conspicuous under neocolonialism.
These media portrayals elicit various reactions from the general Canadian public, many of which are steeped with neocolonial ideology. This is evident when examining the comments posted in response to online news articles, for example, CBC’s coverage of two missing Aboriginal women in Quebec in October 2013. Under the article entitled *Two Aboriginal Mothers Missing from Kitigan Zibi Reserve*, one can find comments such as “time to end the hopelessness, abuse, and living in exile… shut down the reserves and come live with the rest of Canada,” and “I’m sure that when the money runs out they will return to the real world… where they will claim to be poverty stricken”. These comments, as well as many others on the website, paint the missing Aboriginal women as separate from the rest of Canada, and places blame on the women in question. There are also comments of quite the opposite nature, taking a defensive stance and attempting to point out Canada’s colonial past and its effects on the Aboriginal population. These comments are overshadowed, however, by prevalent and unsympathetic victim-blaming. The reactions of the general public reinforce Aboriginal women as an inferior group, one that is deserving of any violence they may experience. This is a dangerous narrative dominating Canadian views and signals the desperate need for change and action.

Pressure to address the extreme violence against Aboriginal women and dismantle forms of (neo)colonial marginalization is increasingly addressed by many outlets. The United Nations has called for a national inquiry at the federal level regarding missing and murdered Aboriginal women; however, the Canadian government has refused to do so thus far. In recent years, numerous reports have been conducted and Aboriginal and human rights organizations have spoken out about the issue of violence against Aboriginal women. Among them, the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) has been at the forefront. The NWAC “works to advance the well-being of Aboriginal women and girls, as well as their families and communities through activism, policy analysis and advocacy.” The organization represents a grassroots approach to change, starting with Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal women. A report released by the NWAC, the product of their National Aboriginal Women’s Forum, advocates strong community and Aboriginal leadership and outlines a holistic approach to violence including traditional teachings, the importance of culture, and female and male empowerment. They believe that Aboriginal women cannot wait for government action, and regardless, the government should only play a complementary role, emphasizing the importance of local solutions. This contrasts Amnesty International Canada’s Stolen Sisters report, which
highlights the role of the federal government in each of its six recommendations. Notably, the last recommendation is to end the marginalization of Aboriginal women through education by addressing “the history of dispossession and marginalization” of Aboriginal people in Canada.\footnote{Oxford Dictionaries Online. “Marginalize.” Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/marginalize?q=marginalization#marginalize__25.} If extreme violence against Aboriginal women is to stop, then first, their marginalization must come to an end. Through cooperation between Aboriginal groups at the local level and government action at the national level, perhaps Aboriginal women can begin to heal from Canada’s colonial past — but only if the neocolonialism is dealt with as well.

The colonization of Canada proved relentless in alienating Aboriginal women from the rest of the population. This oppression has resulted in severe and ongoing violence against Aboriginal women. Government policies, specifically the \textit{Indian Act}, demonstrate how Aboriginal women were treated as inferior and unvalued. This drastically altered traditional Aboriginal gender values, creating a divide between male and female that persists today. In the twenty-first century, and the decades preceding, Aboriginal women have been suffering from gendered and racialized discrimination, occupying unacceptably low socio-economic positions. This has led to increased exposure to violence, as these women take risky jobs in order to survive. In the most extreme cases, Aboriginal women have gone missing and been murdered. Police assistance and media coverage has only further perpetuated these women as marginalized: an idea echoed throughout the general public. However, many groups have rallied to raise awareness about violence against Aboriginal women and call for solutions from Aboriginal communities and the federal government. In order to end violence against Aboriginal women, the consequences of Canada’s long colonial history, namely, the persistence of neocolonial ideology, must be addressed. Aboriginal women have been ignored for too long; their invisibility must end.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{2} Low, C (Producer), & Richardson, B & Ianzelo, T (Directors), \textit{Cree Hunters of Mistassini}, [Film], (1974; Canada: National Film Board of Canada.)
\bibitem{5} Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, “RCAP”
\bibitem{7} Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, “RCAP”
\end{thebibliography}


Culhane, D. “Their Spirits Live within Us.”

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Fiske, J. “Boundary Crossings.”: 254.

Culhane, D. “Their Spirits Live within Us.”

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.
Bibliography


Low, C (Producer), & Richardson, B & Ianzelo, T (Directors). Cree Hunters of Mistassini. [Film]. 1974. Canada: National Film Board of Canada.


HIV Prevention through Empowerment: An Assessment of the Shifting Trends in Anti-HIV Frameworks and Program Priorities of Health Interventions in Indian Female Sex Workers (FSW) Communities from 1992 Onwards.

Ali Tejpar

As a segment of the population highly vulnerable to HIV infection, Indian female sex workers (FSWs) represent a demographic that has been targeted through numerous health interventions. As such, four various development endeavours and the shifting trends in their HIV-prevention frameworks are assessed chronologically. The Sonagachi Project of 1992 framed HIV prevention in terms of worker and women’s rights. This endeavour sought to empower FSWs through peer education, in order to increase HIV awareness and establish social support networks. In contrast, the National AIDS Control Programme of the same year was focused on providing access to social and health resources, such as condom promotion and antiretroviral therapy. However, research conducted in FSW communities has emphasized that condom promotion efforts have limited success, given the structural inabilities of FSWs to negotiate condom use with male stakeholders. The third intervention, the Aastha project of 2004 – implemented by Family Health International--thereby focused on facilitating collective mobilization against oppressive stakeholders for over 20,000 FSWs throughout the targeted region. The final project, the Avahan initiative of 2010 – funded by the Gates Foundation--accordingly sought to address the need to empower FSWs through improving their advocacy and negotiation skills with clients, while also enhancing their access to social and health resources. Through an assessment of the shifting priorities of anti-HIV efforts in FSW communities, it has become increasingly evident that recent endeavours to incorporate access to health and social resources in addition to collective and individual empowerment strategies have provided effective and sustainable solutions in reducing HIV risks. Challenges, however, remain in achieving comprehensive HIV interventions by including male stakeholders in project planning and implementation.

As a state with a significant population living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), India is a country whose “burden of infection makes tackling the HIV epidemic...a [national and international] health priority.”1 Within the estimated population of two and half million people living with HIV, the Indian National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) has identified female sex workers (FSWs) as a specific high-risk group for HIV infection and transmission.2 Accordingly, targeted health interventions in female sex worker communities are considered to be essential by national policymakers and health experts to stemming the spread of the virus.3 Despite the “expanding arsenal of individual level HIV prevention technologies” – such as antiretroviral treatments and pre/post-exposure prophylaxis – there is substantial evidence that community-level empowerment interventions are fundamental to facilitating long-
term prevention efforts. Such methods aim to foster safe-sex behaviours, increase health education and facilitate access to HIV-prevention/treatment resources as a means of combating the epidemic. Female sex workers are at the greatest risk of HIV infection as a result of “gender-based marginalization, exacerbated by poverty and caste/class/ethnicity-based discrimination.” This results in higher-risk sex work, due to a structural lack of power and agency to negotiate with clients (Ibid). In this regard, a number of community-based interventions among female sex workers (FSWs) in India have been implemented with the aim of empowering these groups via sexual health education, collective rights bargaining and the facilitation of access to HIV treatment resources.

Through a chronological evaluation of four specific, anti-HIV empowerment initiatives in Indian FSW communities from 1992 onwards, this paper will explore the trends in program priorities and the anti-HIV frameworks used in these approaches. These four initiatives have been chosen based on their reflection of national evolutions in anti-HIV agendas and strategies relating to FSWs. Within the context of this paper, empowerment is conceptualized as interventions and processes with positive impacts on measured variables “linked to program goals to reduce vulnerability to HIV/STDs using...effective HIV/STD prevention frameworks.” Furthermore, empowerment initiatives focus development efforts on improving both the agency and status of women to give them the tools to overcome structural susceptibilities to infection. Based on the current literature and analyses of projects thus far, this paper will address how recent endeavours have adopted measures to empower Indian FSWs through enhancing their advocacy and negotiation skills. Subsequent improvements in FSWs’ levels of self-esteem, confidence and efficacy have resulted in stronger abilities to demand condom use with clients, as well as engage in collective bargaining for social support. Accordingly, this shifting focus on both collective and individual empowerment of FSWs, in addition to the provision of health and social resources, will be argued to constitute a more sustainable and long-term approach to reducing HIV risks, through providing effective negotiation skills training.

The first intervention to be outlined is the Sonagachi Project, conducted in 1992, which framed HIV prevention in terms of worker and women’s rights for FSWs. In the same year, the National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) alternatively framed the issue as one that could be addressed through peer-led behaviour changes to encourage safer sex practices, condom promotion and easier access to health resources. Responses to this study reported that the
promotion of condom use did not adequately address the systemic inability of FSWs to insist on condom use with clients. Subsequent recommendations thereby underscored “the need to build FSWs’ persuasive powers and their skills in negotiating condom use” – persuasion being understood as “the art of convincing the client on the benefits of condom use for safeguarding him, his spouse and children from sexual infections.” Even so, HIV prevention efforts shifted from targeting individual risk behaviour to community-based empowerment approaches. This resulted from the “growing awareness of the complex social, cultural, political, and economic forces shaping the HIV epidemic.” The Aastha Programme, delivered in 2004, resultantly focused on participatory action. This was achieved through forming FSW self-help advocacy groups to address police and state abuse, while securing social services such as ration and voter identity cards. Findings of this study indicated that FSW collectivization increased confidence in “standing up to the police and troublesome stakeholders,” thus providing a more comprehensive approach to HIV prevention than focusing solely on risk behaviour changes.

The final study to be discussed, implemented in 2010 as part of Avahan – the Indian AIDS initiatives of the Gates Foundation, focused on community mobilization, while additionally providing training through focus groups to enhance FSWs’ efficacy, self-esteem and abilities to negotiate safer sex practices with clients. This integrated framework to incorporate community and individual empowerment, in addition to the provision of health and social resources, has been reported to “improve self-efficacy for condom use and service utilization, and actual condom use and service utilization.” In essence, the progressive shifts in intervention strategies and anti-HIV frameworks reflect the evolving understandings of the needs and obstacles self-identified by Indian FSWs.

Nevertheless, Indian female sex workers continually face a number of structural barriers in regards to HIV prevention efforts. Given the highly stigmatized nature of their work, FSWs face abject levels of discrimination within society. Violence and abuse are daily occurrences by “intimate partners, brothel owners, pimps and middle-men, and the police.” As a result of socioeconomic marginalization, disempowerment and high levels of vulnerability, FSWs are particularly susceptible to HIV transmission. Indian FSWs’ vulnerability to HIV is further exacerbated as a result of prevalent intravenous drug use, “early age initiation of sex,” human trafficking and alcohol abuse. Living conditions, particularly in urban settings, such as Mumbai, are deplorable for women involved in sex work with “basic requirements of food,
clothing, shelter, hygiene and health care facilities sparsely unavailable.” Sexual violence, often as a result of clients’ demands for sex without a condom, is a common occurrence in the lives of FSWs, which commonly increases the “likelihood for lacerations and vaginal trauma.” As a result of such significant levels of sexual, physical and structural violence, FSWs have adopted coping strategies to minimize “hurt and expenses and maximizing safety and savings” through “working longer hours, borrowing money...offering sex for lower prices without condoms, etc.” — activities associated with high risk behaviours in contracting HIV. To address these issues, development interventions have varied their focuses from safe sex behaviour promotion, to the provision of health services, to individual and community mobilization and empowerment.

Given that the consistent use of condoms by FSWs is associated with financial losses “estimated around 70% compared to less consistent condom users,” intervention programmes face an uphill battle in promoting safe sex behaviours. With this in mind, the Sonagachi Project began as a result of a locally-led appraisal of STD/HIV risk in Kolkata’s largest red-light district, by the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in 1991. National health care professionals were able to gain access to sex workers by speaking with local stakeholders, such as police, politicians, and brothel owners and framing the intervention as an effort to prevent HIV “threats to the livelihoods and health of the whole community.”

The subsequent intervention in 1992 sought to empower FSWs, through hiring and training local sex workers as peer educators, “condom social marketers” and as leaders and program administrators. The success of the Sonagachi Project evolved as a result of its focus on empowerment and the mobilization of various financial resources (e.g., the World Health Organization, the UK Department for International Development, the Gates Foundation, the [Indian] government) “to build a social movement of more than 60,000 sex workers...to over 60 communities in West Bengal.” Studies detail the Sonagachi Project’s effective empowerment framework through the establishment of a number of goals: a) providing a framework to motivate change; b) increasing education on risk and protective factors; c) building affective, behavioural, and cognitive skills; d) reducing structural barriers to change; and e) building sustainable social support systems. Accordingly, Sonagachi-modeled interventions indicated a 39 percent increase in condom use rates by FSWs over a sixteen-month project, “compared to standard care control (11%).” By framing HIV issues in FSW communities as a worker and
women’s rights movement, the Sonagachi Project was able to improve knowledge and condom use, provide a reorientation of sex work as a valid occupation and facilitate the creation of social support networks, in order to increase group savings and other sources of income for older FSWs. This particular intervention strategy would serve as a foundational model for further mentioned programmes focused on empowerment, through both collective and individual mobilization.

During the same year, the Indian government launched the National AIDS Control Programme (NACP), with the goal of HIV prevention through peer-led counselling, condom promotion, quarterly health check-ups for sexually transmitted infection treatments and access to antiretroviral therapy. With over 1,200 NACP projects in FSW communities across the country, government reports indicated overall improvements in the reduction of national HIV prevalence among sex workers, through both structural and behavioral interventions. The NACP interventions thereby framed the issue in terms of increasing promotion and access to social and health resources. However, ensuing studies highlighted that condom promotion was only as effective as the abilities of FSWs to insist on condom use with clients. Moreover, research on Indian FSWs reports that “FSWs in general lack the skills, ability, and power to negotiate condom use with clients.” National agendas on the HIV epidemic thereby emphasized three key issues to address in FSW communities:

   a) are FSWs able to bring condom use into the picture/discuss condom use when they meet clients, b) are FSWs able to stand their ground/insist on condom use when clients refuse to use condoms, particularly if they are offered additional payment, and c) are FSWs able to convince unwilling clients to use condoms?

These priorities are further emphasized with research findings that nearly one-third of FSWs use condoms inconsistently, if at all. The need for negotiation skills training was conceptualized through having FSWs increase their abilities to: ask clients to use a condom, refuse to have sex if the client chooses not to use a condom, “refusing to have sex for more money if a client is not willing to use a condom” and negotiating condom use with an unwilling client. While the NACP interventions facilitated access to health and social resources, it highlighted the need for advocacy and negotiation skills training for FSWs as priorities for future endeavours.
The third intervention to be discussed is the Aastha project, implemented in 2004 by Family Health International, in two districts of Maharashtra in Thane and Mumbai – regions characterized by high levels of HIV prevalence and large populations of FSWs. Based on the understanding of structural barriers faced by these communities, Aastha sought to promote collective mobilization training for over 20,000 FSWs working in brothels, bars, in the streets and in homes. Reports detail the vast levels of structural violence, in concluding that almost all brothel-keepers receive a “50% share of the FSWs’ earnings” and exercise control over FSWs’ condom usage with clients. Contrastingly, street-based FSWs, who belong to lowest socioeconomic threshold, often fall at the “mercy of pimps, local goons and the police, who are the main perpetrators of violence.” Alternatively, home-based FSWs “solicit clients through a phone network of pimps” and thus constitute a difficult-to-reach population.

Consequently, the Aastha project organized a project team of sex workers and peer educators to facilitate the creation of self-help groups called Aastha Gats (AGs) throughout the targeted region. These groups came together to focus on building FSWs’ collective capacity for decision-making, leadership, crisis management, problem solving and the organization of mass rallies. Of the sample of over 20,000 FSWs in the study, roughly 71.3 percent reported improvements in “medium and high collective efficacy for achieving goals.” Collectivization thus resulted in the enhanced confidence and self-esteem needed to “stand up to power structures, including brothel keepers, the police and brokers.” Surveys conducted during the project describe how, prior to the intervention, FSWs did not have strong social support networks with each other and engaged in rivalries for territory and clients. Following the facilitation of focus groups, FSWs discussed the creation of forums to address commonly faced issues and develop strategies to collectively work together to support one another. One emerging trend was the phenomenon of individual FSWs more actively insisting on condom use with clients or resisting violent confrontation, “with the belief that the larger group would intervene if needed.”

Through organized action, FSWs are better equipped to tackle the “complex social, cultural, political, and economic vulnerabilities faced by marginalized population groups most at risk of acquiring HIV infection.” By means of collective mobilization against state stakeholders, FSWs were able to gain access to public entitlements including bank accounts, ration cards and ownership of land for housing. Overall, project analysis of anti-HIV
endeavours describe how “involving FSWs directly in organizational activities and empowerment strategies reduces their vulnerability to HIV/STIs as compared with programmes that provide only clinical and prevention services.” The explicit need for initiatives to train FSWs in advocacy and negotiation skills with clients, however, was addressed with the implementation of Avahan, the Indian AIDS project of the Gates Foundation in 2010. Through the delivery of health programs in various districts throughout the Maharashtra region, Avahan sought to reduce the risk of HIV transmission, by means of improving access to health services, as well as scaling up community mobilization endeavours. By modifying the anti-HIV agenda through targeting self-identified priorities by Indian FSWs, interventions were better able to address the national health epidemic, while implementing sustainable solutions. Surveys conducted during Avahan’s duration indicated that empowerment strategies resulted, not only in “improved self-efficacy for condom use and service utilization,” but also increasing FSWs’ abilities to “resist abuse from others in the community.” By gaining the necessary skills to negotiate condom use with clients, advocate for group rights and more effectively engage in collective mobilization against stakeholder abuse, FSWs have become better equipped to overcome societal, cultural and health barriers in the struggle against the HIV epidemic.

Thus, the evolution of anti-HIV frameworks and program priorities of development interventions in Indian female sex worker communities reflects the growing understandings of the needs and structural barriers faced by these groups. By seeking to incorporate self-identified areas of concern and actively mobilizing together through participatory programmes, FSWs have improved their access to health and social resources in addition to engaging in group advocacy with stakeholders. The 1992 Sonagachi Project promoted behavioural change through framing the struggle of FSWs as a workers and women’s rights issue, which was argued to have effectively addressed gaps in FSW’s HIV knowledge, while emphasizing collective empowerment. Conversely, the National AIDS Control Programme, in the same year, focused its efforts on health and social services promotion to improve FSWs’ access to anti-HIV resources. While the NACP endeavour addressed a key area of need for FSW communities, it failed to provide the skills training and community mobilization to actually encourage consistent use of condoms and other preventative measures. In light of this, the multilaterally funded Aastha programme of 2004 focused on peer education, aimed at encouraging collective bargaining with stakeholders and advocacy initiatives to reduce abuse from brothel keepers, police officials, and
government politicians. Addressing the need for collective mobilization facilitated the opportunity for FSW communities to band together and face systemic barriers. Furthermore, it helped them devise group solutions to issues such as brothel owner abuse, sexual violence at the hands of abusive clients and difficulties in accessing state resources. Nevertheless, FSWs did not have the training or the honed abilities to effectively negotiate condom use with clients, thus presenting a fundamental barrier to anti-HIV efforts. As such, recent endeavours, like the Avahan initiative, with the support of national and non-governmental organization funding, focused efforts on FSW empowerment to improve levels of self-esteem, confidence and efficacy with clients. Through an assessment of the shifting frameworks and priorities of anti-HIV efforts in FSW communities, it has become increasingly evident that recent endeavours to incorporate access to health and social resources in addition to collective and individual empowerment strategies have provided effective and sustainable solutions in reducing HIV risks. Moving forward, there remain a number of significant considerations to address in future anti-HIV endeavours in these communities. Given the intrinsic patriarchal barriers FSWs still face, studies have highlighted the imperative need to include male stakeholders in anti-HIV efforts. While empowerment strategies have given FSWs the tools to engage in advocacy with male stakeholders, such as brothel owners, pimps, police officials and state politicians, comprehensive HIV interventions require that these stakeholders be included in project planning and implementation. While cultural and societal barriers continue to present obstacles to FSWs’ rights and welfare, vast improvements in stakeholder relations have been made as a result of empowerment interventions and collective mobilization. Thus, in order to overcome structural barriers in the national struggle against HIV, and reach effective and sustainable solutions for Indian female sex workers, ongoing efforts should not only promote access to health and social resources and collective and individual empowerment strategies, but must also seek to incorporate key stakeholders.
4Prinja et al., 354.
5Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Blanchard et al., 11.
10Swendeman et al., 1165.
11Prinja et al., 354.
13Ibid, 6.
15Ibid.
17Gaikwad et al., 72.
18Blanchard et al., 11.
19Ibid.
20Bharat et al., 1.
21Ibid.
22Diwakar Yadav, Shreena Ramanathan, et al. “Role of Community Group Exposure in Reducing Sexually Transmitted Infection-Related Risk among Female Sex Workers in India,” PLOS One, 8,10 (2013), 1.
24Karandikar and Gezinski, 113.
26Karandikar and Gezinski, 113.
27Swendeman et al.,1159.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid, 1157.
32Swendeman et al.,1158.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Prinja et al., 354.
36Bharat et al., 1.
37Ibid, 2.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Bharat et al., 2.
42 Gaikwad et al., 69.
43 Ibid, 70.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Gaikwad et al., 69.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, 73.
50 Gaikwad et al., 76.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Gaikwad et al., 73.
54 Punyam et al., 87.
55 Ibid.
56 Gaikwad et al., 69.
57 Blanchard et al., 2.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 11.
60 Karandikar and Gezinski, 125.
Bibliography


The Big Picture: Colonial Legacy and the Evolution of Electoral Formula Choice in Africa

Brandon Pasternak

The theory that colonialism can have a substantial impact on a country's democratic experience has received significant support. In particular, Blais and Massicotte argue that British colonial legacy – the extent to which a colonizer's choice of electoral formula is related to that of its colony – is quite strong. However, their focus on the current electoral formula ignores the big picture as to how formula choice evolves: what is the initial choice following independence and does that choice endure over time? After exploring how electoral formula choice evolves in twenty-four African countries (twelve British and twelve French colonies), it becomes less clear whether British colonial legacy is as strong as Blais and Massicotte suggest. Instead, it appears that ethnic homogeneity is related to formula choice. Accounting for formula evolution and what causes these changes ultimately helps to better illuminate the relationship between electoral formula choice and value prioritization.

The argument proceeds in five parts. Part one provides a brief overview of Blais and Massicotte's work, emphasizing the problems with focusing solely on a country's current formula choice. In response, the second part describes the methodology that will be employed in this study. The third section analyzes the initial results to determine whether there is evidence of a colonial legacy. In part four, the study delves deeper into the relationship to identify whether

Brandon Pasternak is a fourth year student studying Political Studies and Economics at Queen’s University.
accounting for how formula choice evolves affects these results. Finally, part five presents the main findings and concludes with their broader significance.

I - Blais and Massicotte: Ignoring the Big Picture

In a macroscopic study of 164 countries, Blais and Massicotte discover that colonial background can be a strong predictor of what electoral formula was adopted by a colony following independence.³ The term formula refers to the mathematical formula used to allocate seats.⁴ The method employed by Blais and Massicotte notes what electoral formula a country currently uses (final choice), and whether the colonizer uses the same formula. With British colonies being most likely to imitate Britain by opting for plurality and French colonies tending not to choose France's majority rule, Blais and Massicotte conclude that British colonial legacy is significantly stronger than its French counterpart.⁶

Nevertheless, Blais and Massicotte's work is insufficient, as it captures only part of the story. If a country currently uses the same electoral formula as its colonizer, a few questions remain unanswered: did the country adopt the colonizer's formula immediately after independence and then sustain it over time, or did it choose a different path initially before eventually deciding to follow its colonizer?

**Figure 1:** The 'Formula Evolution' Dimension as the 'Big Picture'
Answering these questions is important for a number of reasons. First, it paints a more detailed picture of a country's electoral formula history. Change is inevitable over half a century; thus, understanding the final choice in context requires observing 'formula evolution' – does the initial choice at independence endure to the end or change along the way (see Figure 1)? Second, it reveals that there are multiple paths a country can take that lead to the same formula choice in the end: (1) the 'loyal son' who consistently follows in their colonial father's footsteps, and (2) the 'prodigal son' who strays away before eventually returning. Distinguishing between these paths has enormous implications. For example, British colony A and B both arrive at the same final choice of plurality in 1995, but by taking different paths. Colony A is a loyal son, choosing plurality at independence in 1910 and sustaining it until 1995. Conversely, colony B is a prodigal son, embracing plurality not at independence, but in 1994. Colony A's immediate adoption suggests that the colonial power had some direct impact. Whereas, it can be argued that colony B's choice of plurality over eighty years later was mere coincidence or due to some exogenous influence, not the realization of colonial destiny. Furthermore, colony A used the same formula for over eighty years, indicative of greater longevity relative to colony B. Intuitively, it appears that colony A presents a much stronger case for colonial legacy.

However, these differences are lost in Blais and Massicotte's study because the sole focus is on final formula choice. Moreover, if colony A's path was modified slightly, such that it switched to PR in 1994 (i.e., South Africa's path), the study would go so far as to favour colony B as evidence of colonial legacy, while disregarding potential influence on colony A. Therefore, observing only the end result hides the 'big picture' concerning how a country's formula evolves over time, which could affect whether colonial legacy is considered strong or weak. This would be the case for South Africa, whose eighty-four year imitation of British plurality has been ignored.

Finally, knowing which path a country pursues reveals what elements of colonial rule may have caused the colonizer's formula to be transferred to its colony. If the colony chooses the same formula at independence, this may be attributed to a direct institutional impact; perhaps the colonial power orchestrated elections in prior years to habituate the local political elite to the process of using that formula. Conversely, adopting the same formula many years later may point more towards the existence of an influential political culture, fostered by the colonial power. Although initially suppressed due to a growing nationalist movement, the political culture
may eventually resurface, encouraging imitation of the colonizer. For these reasons, this study will build on Blais and Massicotte's work by examining the 'formula evolution' dimension that they ignore.\(^7\)

**II - Methodology: Building on Blais and Massicotte**

This analysis is concerned with colonial legacy – the relationship between a colonizer's choice of electoral formula and that of its colony, and whether the former influences (causality) or is strongly correlated with the latter. Since proving causality would be more difficult given the limited data available, the focus is on correlation. If a strong correlation is found, this implies that colonial legacy is strong and, since correlation is necessary but not sufficient for causation, that a causal influence *may* exist.\(^8\) The strength of colonial legacy may or may not vary depending on the colonizer.

A sample of twenty-four African countries is observed: twelve British colonies (Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda) and twelve French colonies (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia). Britain and France were chosen as colonizers to facilitate the comparison between Blais and Massicotte's findings and those in this study. The countries/colonies were selected because they represent a substantial range in population, geographic size and location, duration of colonial rule and degree of ethnic homogeneity. Thus, it is theoretically possible to explore whether these exogenous factors influence formula choice.

Furthermore, a continental level of analysis is the more appropriate fit for the study's limited sample size. A sample of almost half of the total population (24/54 African countries) is representative and produces more promising results than a sample that is similar in size, but drawn from a much larger population (24/193 countries in the world). Establishing a stronger conclusion that is only continent-specific is more valuable than a weaker conclusion that is applicable on a global scale. Beyond having an incredible degree of internal diversity, Africa was chosen as the region of study because it is the only continent containing a substantial number of countries with French colonial histories and an equal number with British colonial histories. Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific have either not enough British or French colonies to produce a "N" large enough to make any decent conclusions.
The following endogenous variables each describe a different aspect of colonial legacy: destiny, imitation and loyalty. A country is *destined* if its current and final choice of electoral formula matches that of the colonizer. A country *imitates* if its initial choice immediately following independence matches that of the colonizer (formula choice may or may not change in the future). Finally, a country is *loyal* if its initial choice is an imitation, and if this choice endures long enough to become the final choice in the end (imitation *and* destiny). Destiny, imitation and loyalty are simply specific instances in which, respectively, the final choice, initial choice and choice endurance involve selecting the colonizer's formula.

Destiny illustrates the long-run story by revealing where a country ends up. If a country currently uses its colonizer's formula, despite it not being the country's initial choice, this could be explained by an *eventual* influence in the years after independence if the colonizer and colony maintain a strong relationship in which electoral advice is provided. However, such a relationship might grow increasingly tenuous as the country becomes established in its independence because it is more likely to make changes to its electoral system to suit its own interests and more inclined to ignore outside influence. Indeed, destiny on its own is probably the weakest indicator of colonial legacy, and potentially indicative of coincidence.

Blais and Massicotte focus on destiny, but ignore the variables pertaining to how formula choice evolves over time – imitation and loyalty, and by association, their respective emphases on initial choice and endurance. Imitation captures the short-run story and suggests that influence can be direct (e.g., choosing *for* the colony) or indirect (e.g., the colonizer's political culture shapes that of the colony, in turn influencing choice). Aforementioned in part one, imitation – even on its own – is intuitively a much stronger sign that legacy exists. Finally, loyalty highlights not only influence on initial choice, but also the endurance of that influence, possibly due to institutional momentum. Combining imitation *and* destiny, loyalty is the ideal indicator of legacy.
For comparative purposes, these variables are calculated for British and French colonies separately (x = British or French) as follows, 0 being no legacy and 1 being a very strong legacy:

\[
\text{IMITATION} = \frac{\# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies that imitated}}{\text{total } \# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies}}
\]
\[
\text{DESTINY} = \frac{\# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies that followed destiny}}{\text{total } \# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies}}
\]
\[
\text{LOYALTY} = \frac{\# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies that were loyal}}{\text{total } \# \text{ of } x \text{ colonies}}
\]

A high value indicates that the colonizer's formula choice is strongly related to the colony's choice, and thus that colonial legacy is strong.

III - Initial Results

The data and results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Only one French colony was fully destined (Mali), while two eventually opted for mixed formulas with majority elements (Cameroon and Mauritania), producing a destiny value of 0.17. As the 'prodigal son,' Mali is the only colony to have fully adopted the majority formula. In comparison, the British value is 0.83; nine colonies followed destiny and two were partially destined in that they eventually chose a mixed formula with plurality elements (Lesotho and Sudan).

Concerning imitation, not one French colony chose majority rule at independence. Even including those French colonies with a mixed formula comprised of majoritarian elements, there would only be two – Madagascar and Mauritania. In contrast, every British colony imitated. The imitation value of 0.08 for France, indicative of a very weak or practically nonexistent legacy, is overshadowed by Britain's value of 1.00, suggesting a very strong legacy.

Loyalty can also be observed. One French colony is partially loyal (Mauritania), having adopted a mixed formula and sustaining it. The French loyalty value is thus 0.04. The British value is 0.83, with two colonies (Lesotho and Sudan) changing from plurality to mixed and one (South Africa) to PR.
These results support Blais and Massicotte's conclusion that British colonial background is a strong predictor of electoral formula choice. In fact, Blais and Massicotte understate this relationship by only focusing on destiny (0.83 in this case), ignoring the much stronger imitation value of 1.00. Similarly, their conclusion that French colonialism was a weak predictor of choice is understated as well: the destiny value is 0.17, but the imitation value is 0.08, even weaker. It initially seems as if including the 'formula evolution' dimension, adding the imitation and loyalty variables to account for initial choice and endurance, only strengthens their results. Nevertheless, when approaching the data from a different angle, the results change.

**Table 1: The Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonizer &amp; Colony</th>
<th>Initial Electoral Formula Choice</th>
<th>Final Electoral Formula Choice</th>
<th>Endurance of Formula Choice</th>
<th>Population (000)</th>
<th>Geographic Size (km²)</th>
<th>Pop Density (pop/km²)</th>
<th>Duration of Colonial Rule</th>
<th>Ethnic Homogeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>35,406</td>
<td>2,381,741</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9,599</td>
<td>112,090</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17,813</td>
<td>274,200</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20,549</td>
<td>475,440</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR/M)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>267,667</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22,401</td>
<td>322,463</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22,599</td>
<td>587,041</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Mixed (Majority/PR)</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15,969</td>
<td>1,240,192</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>1,030,700</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Mixed (Majority/PR)</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32,649</td>
<td>446,550</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18,890</td>
<td>1,267,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10,836</td>
<td>163,610</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>581,730</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>11,295</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25,200</td>
<td>208,539</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44,030</td>
<td>500,367</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>30,355</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>174,508</td>
<td>923,768</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5,613</td>
<td>71,740</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46,801</td>
<td>1,219,030</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6,261</td>
<td>1,861,484</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>Mixed (Plurality/PR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>17,364</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48,252</td>
<td>947,300</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34,759</td>
<td>241,036</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Nohlen, Thibaut and Krennich, 2003
2 Ace, 2013
3 IFES, 2013
4 The World Factbook, 2013
5 Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013abcede
6 Pearson, 2003
Table 2: Endogenous Variables - Colonial Legacy as Imitation, Destiny and Loyalty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonizer &amp; Colony</th>
<th>Imitation (Yes, No or Partial*)</th>
<th>Destiny (Yes, No or Partial)</th>
<th>Loyalty (Yes, No or Partial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>French</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1/12 or 0.08</td>
<td>2/12 or 0.17</td>
<td>0.5/12 or 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>12/12 or 1.00</td>
<td>10/12 or 0.83</td>
<td>10/12 or 0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV - How Does Including the 'Formula Evolution' Dimension Change the Results?

Hitherto, initial choice and endurance have only been considered insofar as they satisfied the 'colonizer-colony match' requirements for imitation and loyalty (i.e., asking "did British colonies adopt plurality and French colonies adopt majority rule?"). However, it is also possible to assess final choice, initial choice and choice endurance, ignoring whether the choice under consideration was the colonizer's formula, to identify how this may call into question the strength of British destiny, imitation and loyalty respectively, and thus the potency of British colonial legacy (i.e., ask instead "how many colonies adopted plurality across the board?"). First, observing all twenty-four final choices does not lead to any new discoveries. At present, nine British colonies use plurality, the other three adopting PR or plurality/PR mixes, while French
colonies use a variety of formulas, including two plurality, four mixed and five PR. Evidence of strong British destiny still remains.

In contrast, adding the initial choice and endurance variables does produce interesting results. Concerning initial choice, twenty of the twenty-four countries immediately embraced plurality. Although British colonies still adopted it most frequently, the French chose it eight of twelve times. Of course, this does not affect the weakness of French colonial legacy. Nevertheless, the fact that both French and British colonies were overwhelmingly likely to select plurality as their initial choices undermines the strength of the imitation aspect of British legacy. Perhaps British colonies selected plurality not because they were influenced by the British plurality formula, but for the same exogenous reason why French colonies adopted it.

Furthermore, when considering the longevity or endurance of these choices, 75% of French colonies that had plurality abandoned it, either for PR or a PR/plurality mixed formula, while the British changed from plurality only 25% of the time. Perhaps the strength of British legacy lies not in why British colonies adopted plurality initially, since the French did also, but in the fact that they sustained it over time (loyalty). To identify whether the loyalty aspect of British colonial legacy remains strong, meaning that British colonies retained plurality because of a British impact, the evidence for both British and exogenous influence on endurance is considered.

The Qualitative Case: British Colonial Legacy

It is possible that Britain's own use of the plurality formula is the reason for plurality's persistence among its colonies. Using a detailed description of African electoral history from independence to 1999, mentions of colonizer-orchestrated pre-independence elections for all countries in the study are recorded. Although there are many other colonial policies through which the colonizer's formula could influence that of the colony, this practice in particular is chosen because it would likely be the strongest and most direct way for this to occur. For British colonies, pre-independence elections were mentioned in seven country profiles (five of them being countries that kept plurality). For example, plurality elections for Sierra Leone's Legislative Council were conducted under British rule, potentially instilling in political elites an affinity for the colonizer's formula. Even if this does not provide a complete picture of the extent to which pre-independence elections were used, the frequency of mentions suggests it was likely a common policy.
However, the same can be said of the French colonies, with seven of their profiles also mentioning the use of elections prior to independence. The *Loi Cadre* of 1956, for instance, was established in Mali, Madagascar, Gabon and others to regulate elections for native assemblies. Yet for the three profiles that mentioned what electoral formula was used, plurality was the formula of choice. Even though France may have conducted pre-independence elections, these did not seem to encourage imitation by its own colonies, likely because the majority rule was not applied.

Therefore, it does not appear as if the use of pre-independence elections as a colonial policy can explain the persistence of plurality in British colonies, as both the British and French used this tactic and both used plurality formulas. If institutionalizing plurality in this way influenced its longevity, both British and French colonies should have a similar retention rate. This is not the case, implying that there must be some other factor contributing to the different outcomes. Of course, it might be true that despite both colonizers using the same policy, the British-orchestrated elections kept plurality alive because the mother country itself used plurality, whereas France did not. Britain's ability to model plurality and demonstrate its effectiveness by example may have increased the formula's perceived legitimacy. Nevertheless, the loyalty aspect of British legacy, like imitation, also appears weaker than immediately thought. For this reason, exogenous variables will be observed to test whether there is any other impact on formula endurance.

**The Quantitative Case: Ethnic Homogeneity**

If the use of pre-independence elections does not sufficiently explain the endurance of plurality, perhaps exogenous variables can. Unlike population density and duration of colonial rule, both of which may have intuitively had some relationship with formula choice yet ultimately did not, there seems to be a relatively strong correlation between final formula choice and the degree of ethnic homogeneity (see Table 3a). Using the Fearson Index of Ethnic Fractionalization, which assigns countries a score between 0 (perfectly heterogeneous) and 1 (perfectly homogenous), countries that retained plurality averaged 0.74 and those that adopted PR in the end averaged 0.51. This supports the intuition that ethnically heterogeneous countries would be more inclined to opt for the increased representation and greater degree of inclusivity provided by a switch to PR, a potential tool in easing group tensions. Additionally, only two of
the twelve most homogenous countries (Cameroon and South Africa) left plurality for a formula with PR elements compared to six in the bottom twelve (the most heterogeneous).

### Table 3a: Ethnic Homogeneity and Formula Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Homogeneity*</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Initial Choice of Electoral Formula</th>
<th>Final Choice of Electoral Formula</th>
<th>Visual Scale</th>
<th>Colonizer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial Homogeneity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Most Homogenous Countries</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>Tanzania Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>Uganda Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>Cameroon Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR/M)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>South Africa Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>Madagascar Mixed (M/PR)</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>Gabon Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>Kenya Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>Ghana Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>Nigeria Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>Ivory Coast Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>Gambia Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>Mali Plurality</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>Sudan Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>Burkina Faso Mixed (P/PR)</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>Niger Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>Mauritania Mixed (M/PR)</td>
<td>Mixed (M/PR)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>Benin Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Most Heterogeneous Countries</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>Morocco PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>Botswana Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Algeria Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Swaziland Plurality</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>Lesotho Plurality</td>
<td>Mixed (P/PR)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>Tunisia Plurality</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the Fearson Index of Ethnic Factionalization (0 = perfectly heterogeneous, 1 = perfectly homogenous). Fearson, 2003.

**NOTE:** Underlined formula choices signify those that started with an initial choice of plurality.
The most homogenous countries from both colonial backgrounds chose to use plurality more than the most heterogeneous countries. Thus, British colonialism is not the only possible indicator of plurality maintenance. A positive correlation coefficient of 0.43 (see Table 3b) reaffirms this, suggesting that relative homogeneity is associated with keeping plurality and being able to cope with its potentially less-proportional legislative results.

Table 3b: Correlation Between Final Formula Choice and Exogenous Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Coefficient ($\gamma$)*</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
<th>Duration of Colonial Rule</th>
<th>Ethnic Homogeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.43†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Although formula choice is a categorical variable, it can still be quantified to some extent. Concerning the relationship between ethnic homogeneity and formula choice, the assumption is that ethnically heterogeneous countries would be more inclined to want PR instead of plurality because the former tends to produce more-proportional outcomes. For this reason, because formula choice in this example is essentially a proxy for proportionality, plurality and PR can be quantified by measuring how proportional they are. The Loosemore-Hanby (LH) Index of Proportionality (the absolute value of the difference between seat share and vote share, all divided by two) was calculated for those countries that had relatively recent national legislative election data. For those countries where two elections were observed, the average of both scores was taken. The LH scores for countries that had plurality as their final choice were averaged, as well as those that had PR. Mixed formula users were ignored. Each country was then reassigned the "average LH" value for plurality (17.4) or PR (15.8) based on whether they had plurality or PR as their final choice. Even if PR is not that much more proportional than plurality (based on the sample used), it still provides the necessary numerical distinction between the two. A sample correlation coefficient (from -1 to 1) was then calculated to measure the relationship between formula choice and the above exogenous variables. Negative/positive values indicate a negative/positive relationship, and values closer to ±1 suggest a very strong correlation. The correlation coefficients are listed above.
† The positively, relatively strong correlation between ethnic homogeneity and formula choice suggests that countries with a higher, and thus less-proportional, LH score (17.4 v. 15.8, signifying a choice of plurality) are likely to be more homogenous. Note: given that the sample size is small, the correlation coefficient may be less robust.

The Loosemore-Hanby Index for Plurality and PR*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formula Choice and Country</th>
<th>Loosemore-Hanby Index**</th>
<th>Legislative Election Year(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>2007, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2007, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>20.84</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>2007, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>12.95</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.8525</td>
<td>2004, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.8</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>25.545</td>
<td>2004, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>10.015</td>
<td>2007, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>18.21</td>
<td>2005, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did British colonies tend to be more or less homogenous? Of the twelve countries in the top half – the most homogenous portion – of the distribution, eight were British colonies (see Table 3a). Therefore, since British colonies were more homogenous on average (a Pearson Index value of 0.70 compared to 0.63 for the French), and more-homogenous countries tended to end up with plurality, plurality might have endured in British colonies not because they were influenced by Britain's formula choice, but because their relative homogeneity made it feasible (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Influences on Final Formula Choice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonizer = Britain</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Colony's Final Choice = Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatively Homogenous</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Option A - Positive correlation between being a British colony and a colony's final formula choice being plurality; suggests that Britain's choice of plurality might influence the colony's final choice of plurality (unlikely that the causal arrow would run in the opposite direction)
Option B - Positive correlation between being a British colony and being relatively homogenous, and also a positive correlation between being relatively homogenous and a colony's final choice being plurality; suggests that homogeneity is a 'lurking variable' such that being a British colony might – in theory – influence a colony's final choice of plurality only because British colonies are more homogenous.

**V - Conclusion and Broader Significance**

This analysis has emphasized the relationship between colonial background and a country's choice of electoral formula. The results are significant for two reasons. First, broadening the methodology affects the results. In contrast to Blais and Massicotte's method, this study considers not only a country's final choice of formula in the end, but also a temporal dimension – 'formula evolution' – that includes initial choice and either its endurance or change over time. Adopting this more expansive approach undermines Blais and Massicotte's conclusion by suggesting that the British colonial legacy may not be as strong as they thought or, if it is, that this can be known with less certainty. Although observing destiny, imitation and loyalty initially proved to strengthen the British legacy hypothesis, analyzing initial choice and endurance without considering whether there was a 'colonizer-colony match' revealed that it is unclear whether British influence is the reason why British colonies embraced and held onto plurality.
Second, even if British colonial legacy is not extremely potent, ethnic homogeneity is strongly related to formula choice as well. Controlling for colonial legacy, the high retention rate of plurality among British colonies can be better explained by their relative ethnic homogeneity. Nevertheless, the study can be improved both quantitatively – increasing the sample size and considering a wider array of potential exogenous influences – and qualitatively – exploring other elements of colonialism that might distinguish British rule from French rule to explain why plurality persisted more often in British colonies. Employing a more robust process tracing methodology – using descriptive evidence to infer causality – to enhance the qualitative test for colonial legacy would be beneficial.\(^{14}\) However, as Collier notes, “the analysis fails if the phenomena observed…are not adequately described.”\(^{15}\) Therefore, this approach would require a more detailed analysis of colonial policies in each country than what has been provided here, both to improve descriptive power and determine which process tracing tests to employ.

This study's focus on the 'big picture' – the evolution of formula choice – takes on a broader significance when related to two questions: why does electoral reform occur, and how do political values change? Regarding the former, uncovering what influences formula choice (whether the initial choice or the move from one to another) helps to understand the cost-benefit analysis involved in reform. As Katz argues, a political elite in power may opt for reform despite the costs of doing so because other factors make avoiding reform even more costly.\(^{16}\) This study has revealed what some of these other factors might be, e.g., strong ethnic heterogeneity.

Electoral formulas can also be related back to their underlying values. Since a formula is chosen based on its ability to produce outcomes that satisfy the value preferences of the political elite (or public), observing a country's electoral formula reveals a lot about what its priorities are. Colonial influence and ethnic homogeneity can shape formula choice by affecting these values. If a colonizer embeds certain value preferences in its colony's political culture, these values can guide formula selection. Furthermore, facing a mounting ethnic tension, the political elite may realize that inclusivity and fairness are now more important than accountability and are necessary for stability given the circumstances. This could upset or reinforce the existing value hierarchy and serve as a catalyst for formula reform or preservation. A political elite's hierarchy of values, then, is a filter through which external influences can affect formula choice.
If this is the case, studies that explore what factors are involved in how formulas change might also reveal what factors shape and reinforce values. It may be possible to infer based on why electoral formulas evolve or why reform occurs whether the prioritization of values themselves are changing (i.e., apartheid South Africa versus post-apartheid), or whether different circumstances require that a new formula be applied to realize the existing value hierarchy. For this reason, expanding the temporal aspect of this study by recording how long an electoral formula endures for, how frequently it is disturbed by military or authoritarian rule and why it changes or endures despite pressure for reform will prove useful. Indeed, further developing this focus on the 'big picture' related to evolution and reform will go a long way in improving how political scientists and electoral engineers understand the relationship between electoral formula choice and value prioritization.


5 The time of writing was 1995.


7 Although this discussion of formula choice is applicable to constitutional design more broadly, formula choice will be used as the unit of analysis to provide a more direct comparison to Blais and Massicotte’s work.

8 A strong correlation indicates that a causal influence could exist, but this cannot be proven without a more rigorous methodology. For example, if every British colony adopted the same electoral formula as Britain, there would be an extremely strong correlation. Indeed, having Britain as a colonizer would be associated (perfectly) with having adopted plurality. However, this does not mean that being a British colony influenced those choices. It is possible that there was another exogenous factor involved. Nevertheless, even if strong correlations do not prove causation, it is also true that if being a British colony was not associated with choosing plurality, then it would not make sense to think of causation at all. Therefore, to avoid calling into question the legitimacy of this analysis, any conclusion will be described in terms of correlation.

9 Again, this is not suggesting that the analysis here has produced any predictive power, but merely that the strong correlation found is supportive of Blais and Massicotte’s analysis.


Bibliography


Consociational Democracy in Afghanistan with Lessons from Northern Ireland

Irfan Tahiri

Is the current presidential form of democracy in Afghanistan capable of reducing ethno-national violence? This essay will seek to demonstrate that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan is ineffective at establishing viable and robust democratic institutions. Lessons from Northern Ireland’s consociational system will portray the viability of such a system in Afghanistan.

For over a decade now, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been spearheading one of the most challenging tasks in the 21st century: democratizing Afghanistan. Afghanistan has held its own elections before the Soviet war in 1979, but the last three decades of war and conflict have created a deeply divided society with levels of diffidence and distrust between ethno-national groups. The challenge for ISAF is to create a robust and effective democratic system within this hostile context. However, such a task is much easier said than done. Democratization in Afghanistan has raised alarms for developers and invested actors, considering the recent outbreak of ethno-national conflict and ethnic tensions, resulting from the new presidential democratic system.

This essay seeks to explore the effectiveness of implementing a consociational system of democracy in Afghanistan similar to that of Northern Ireland’s, as a means of reducing ethnic violence. First, it will outline the characteristics of a consociational system and what it aims to achieve. Second, Northern Ireland will be used as a case study to demonstrate how the consociational system implemented curtailed ethnic violence. Third, Afghanistan’s ethnic conflict will be explicated within the context of the new (and current) presidential system, and it will show how similar the nature of this conflict is with respect to what Northern Ireland experienced (and subsequently, why a similar democratic system should be implemented in Afghanistan). Finally, it will address criticisms of this approach.

Irfan Tahiri is a fourth year student studying Political Studies and History at Queen’s University.
Characteristics of Consociational Systems of Democracy

Consociational systems of democracy stress power sharing between groups. They place emphasis on the structure of the system, believing that the agency of political actors is shaped by how the democratic system establishes rewards and punishments.\(^1\) Consociationalism believes that the best democratic system for a deeply divided society is one that has the following: executive power-sharing; proportional representation in the public system; minority vetoes or a system that forces broad coalitions which enhance minority voices; and a certain degree of territorial and corporate autonomy to the group (or groups) in question.\(^2\) Thus, consociationalists acknowledge that ethnic divisions are a reality of deeply divided societies, and they seek to work within this framework by creating regulations and incentives aimed at altering the behavior of political actors. In doing so, the hope is that political parties created along ethnic lines will be encouraged to partake in the democratic process and violence will eventually dissipate as a viable means of achieving political ends.

Northern Ireland’s Consociational Democracy

Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society, wherein decades of violence between Protestants (Unionists) and Catholics (Nationalists) has created distrust between these two ethno-national groups. In 1973-1975, Nationalist and Unionist parties were receiving roughly 80% of the votes, reinforcing the fact that democracies in deeply divided societies will heavily favour ethno-national parties.\(^3\) Since the 1980s, all political parties outside these two ethno-national blocs garnered very little support. The change to an electoral system that was more inclusive was implemented in Northern Ireland in 1994, and it was intended to have these two big ethno-national parties participate in the democratic system. The goal was to ensure a peaceful means to obtaining power, as there was great fear that these political parties would turn against each other, or worse, against the democratic system.\(^4\)

The consociational system of democracy in Northern Ireland ensures that all parties are entitled to a fair share of seats in proportion to their vote; as well, ministries are allocated to parties based on a strict mathematical formula that ensures that each party, even small ones that represent minority interests, receive a spot in the executive.\(^5\) This system guarantees that small parties are treated fairly and that large parties do not dominate. Consequently, there is a forced
compromise as automatic government is formed. The system is formal, permanent and allocation is done liberally and not corporately (that is, per vote share and not per ethnicity).

These conditions have collectively created a favourable environment for democracy to succeed because there are incentives for political parties to work within the structure.⁶ There are some scholars who argue the opposite, such as Rupert Taylor, who believes that consociationalism actually creates favourable conditions for radicals to hijack the system.⁷ He argues that radicals can accuse the moderates within their own bloc of betraying their own group and, consequently, gain popular support. However, other scholars would be skeptical of such claims. Jonathan Tonge conducted a peer-reviewed account of Taylor’s work and found no empirical evidence for Taylor’s claim in Northern Ireland.⁸ What Tonge did find out, however, was that the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sinn Fein party “offer essentially moderate political discourse amid ethnic valence.”⁹ Hence, the moderates in each ethno-national camp exercise a greater deal of control over the political discourse than some give them credit.

Understanding this phenomenon requires an appreciation of the instrumental effect of providing incentives for ethno-national political parties. John McGarry outlines the example of the Sinn Fein party who agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 with the United Kingdom. Sinn Fein agreed to participate in the election because their leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, knew that the Republicans could make significant gains in the legislature and thus, would have seats in the executive.¹⁰ In the election following the 1994 agreement, Sinn Fein won two seats in the executive and because the moderates were able to gain success in achieving power for their group, their voices were strengthened over the hard liners. Since then, the Sinn Fein party has only continued democratizing, and the chances of this party resorting to violence as a means of realizing political goals has significantly diminished compared to just a couple of decades ago.

**Explaining the Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan**

Ever since the fall of the Taliban in 2002, Afghanistan has been struggling with its presidential form of democracy, which has only heightened tensions and violence between ethnicities. This system is structured such that it centralizes power in the executive and effectively excludes all political parties by disallowing their legal recognition (to be explained).¹¹ Before delving into the current ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, it is important to understand how this conflict materialized.
When the Soviet War ended in 1989, the united Mujahideen disintegrated, as each leader vied for political power. These events crystallized into the bitter 1989-1992 civil war, which saw fighting blocs being formed along ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{12} Civilians looked to their local leaders, who were of the same ethnicity, for support and assistance.\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, the nature of the inter-ethnic civil war is perceived by Afghans to have been more brutal and aggressive than what happened during the Soviet war; the result was that pre-existing hostile feelings towards perceived “enemy ethnicities”\textsuperscript{14} were hardened.

Additionally, one cannot exclude the role that political leaders played in manipulating civilians to view other ethnic blocs as being untrustworthy. Stephen Conerman made the claim that present-day inter-ethnic conflicts are inevitably a result of the way leaders abuse the unstable security situation to promote their own political agenda and interests.\textsuperscript{15} He writes that one cannot “disregard the instrumentalization of the ethnic element by political actors, defining monolithic blocks that never existed in reality”.\textsuperscript{16} To understand the instrumental role of the leaders in creating the ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, is to appreciate the significant role that leaders can play in helping to remedy this conflict (as will be explained).

When ISAF implemented the current presidential style of democracy in Afghanistan after 2002, Afghanistan, like Northern Ireland, saw political parties emerging along ethnic lines. The Baloch national movement is a noteworthy example. Before the civil war of 1989-1992, the Baloch people did not express any strong sentiments for a Baloch nationalist movement. Recently, however, sentiments of Baloch nationalism have increased.\textsuperscript{17} The civil war and the period under the Taliban created such built-up resentment and distrust between other ethnicities, that when democracy was introduced with the US invasion, there was no question that the chief form of political organization for the Baloch would take form as an ethnic-based party to promote their interests.\textsuperscript{18} All ethnic groups in Afghanistan experienced the problem, and while Northern Ireland saw only two major parties, Afghanistan had five. The Hizb-e-Islami was a Pashtun religious party; the Jaamat-e-Islami party was a Tajik religious party; the Uzbeks under General Rashid Dostum created the JunbishMilli Islam party; the Hazara formed the Islamic Shia Party, and these merely represent the big ethnic-based parties. In essence, the very system that ISAF hoped would democratize and (hopefully) securitize Afghanistan only heightened the ethnic hostilities that were created by the civil war.
Afghanistan’s Current Political System

Afghanistan’s presidential form of democracy is highly centralized with significant powers in the executive. The president also appoints the governors of provinces (which is not even stipulated in the 2004 Constitution), as well as the mayors of the major cities. These are two huge spheres of influence given the strong level of control that sub-national governments can play in a country where the federal regime’s sovereignty is still weak. This system was produced out of the Bonn Conference of 2001 and, as political-historian Thomas Barfield notes, was created with little Afghan input despite the widespread appearance of this being an inclusive project. Further, President Hamid Karzai has disallowed any legal recognition of political parties, and this has been reinforced with the single-non-transferrable-vote electoral system: Karzai has said that political parties will only increase national disunity. The SNTV system is candidate-centered—that is, citizens vote for candidates who have no party affiliations—and this is precisely how the current electoral system prevents a political party from exercising a meaningful role in the democratization process.

As such, one can conclude that there exists very little incentive for various ethno-national parties to join the democratic process. Given that the vast majority of decisions are made at the top, very little incentives exist for the ethno-national parties to participate democratically. Considering the crucial role that political parties play in the process of democratization, it becomes increasingly difficult to see how the political system will maintain genuine peace in the long-term.

Centralization in the executive has caused major reactions from opposition parties. The Afghan National Front (ANF) is one new movement that has grown to advocate a greater voice for smaller parties and a more decentralized government in Kabul. The ANF has asked for proportional representation and re-dividing the electoral districts based on population and demography, two things that seek to promote a system that is more inclusive of all political parties. However, one troubling aspect of the ANF is that it is an ethnic response: the ANF is composed of mainly three ethno-nationalities, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara, (most of whom reside in the North). Once again an issue that is seemingly secular in nature has been trivialized as an ethnic struggle. Additionally, scholars, like Mark Natz, purport the view that the United States’ decision to appoint Karzai as president, based on previous rapport with him, has only increased hostility towards Karzai’s bloc from other ethnic groups. These groups view the Pashtuns as the
“privileged” group reaping the rewards of the current system. This current system in Afghanistan is strikingly similar to the system in Northern Ireland before 1994.

The major difference is that, where the Sinn Fein party decided to participate in the electoral process instead of continuing to resort to violence because of incentives, the ethno-national political parties in Afghanistan have not stopped using violence as a means of pursuing ends. By virtue of the current presidential system, it is not hard to see why. Although security has improved in Afghanistan, it is not because of the democratic system. Rather, the suppression of violence can be attributed to the presence of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Afghanistan’s Consociational Democratic Political System?

Why should a consociational system of democracy similar to Northern Ireland’s be implemented in Afghanistan? The reason is that the “identity matrix” (as McGarry terms it) of Northern Ireland is as stringent as the one in Afghanistan. Given the importance of this identity matrix within this society, it is easier to accept the notion that one must work within the ethnic context because political parties based on ethno-national lines will not disappear from these societies anytime soon.

The nature of how people identify themselves in a society is known as the society’s “identity matrix.” For example, in Canada, the major ethno-national group is French-Canadians. However, the identity matrix in this society is fairly fluid, and thus one can identify as both Canadian and French-Canadian simultaneously. Therefore, it becomes possible to envision a situation where strong national unity can still be created regardless of this prominent political cleavage. Deeply divided societies are different and have much more stringent identity matrices. In Northern Ireland the overwhelming majority of people identify as either Catholic (Republican) or Protestant (Unionist), and they are viewed as being mutually exclusive groups. As McGarry and O’Leary write, “Northern Ireland’s identity matrices are different because they are opposed rather than compatible and therefore insufficiently strong to weaken the polarized identities.”

Contemporary Afghanistan is a similar case. Recently there has been a surge in people’s desires to highlight ethnic differences. People view the various ethno-national identities as being mutually exclusive; that is, one cannot identify as being a Pashtun and a Tajik (even if they
have parents who are from these two different ethnicities). Thus, we have a situation where a highly centralized presidential democratic system has led to the creation of ethno-national political parties. And further, the threat of increased ethnic violence still exists because political parties do not view the structure of the political system as favourable for pursuing their interests. According to consociationalists, like McGarry and O’Leary, Northern Ireland is an example of a successful case study, wherein a consociational democracy reduced ethnic violence because of its commitment to “responsible realism.” “Responsible realism” means that one accepts the assumption that individuals within these societies possess a desire to be identified as mutually exclusive in relation to the other ethno-national groups. Thus, these forms of identification are “distinct national identities, not merely ethnic heritages.”

Given the resemblance of Northern Ireland’s problems of democratization a few decades ago and Afghanistan’s current situation, similar (not the same) solutions will remedy these problems: recognizing the benefits of a decentralized executive and creating incentives for major political parties to participate. Leaders of these ethno-national political parties, who manipulated their people into distrusting other ethnic groups, need to perceive the structure of the democratic system as being favourable for achieving their ends. If this happens, these leaders can convince their people that democracy is the best possible solution. Northern Ireland’s experience indicates that regardless of how extreme, radical, violent or uncompromising leaders of ethno-national political parties may seem, they are primarily pursuing their political interests. Should they perceive a realistic opportunity for obtaining success via the democratic system, such as being guaranteed a position on the executive and having proportional representation in the legislature and judiciary, one can conclude that the political party will eventually view violence as a less credible means for achieving their goals.

**Criticism of Consociational Systems**

One of the biggest concerns for critics of consociationalism, like Tilley et. all, is that the system highlights differences. Critics believe that this system promotes and solidifies ethnic differences, and it could prevent the possibility of one national unity. But scholars, like Tonge, respond by agreeing with McGarry and O’Leary, in that ethnic divisions cannot be washed away and “failure to acknowledge them is dangerous and futile.” The reality of deeply divided societies is that people are attached to their ethno-national blocs and will form political parties
based on that ethno-national identity, and as a result, they view every issue through an ethno-
national lens. Creating a strong political structure, with incentives for all political actors, compels
them to use democratic (and therefore peaceful) means versus violence.

Another criticism is that consociationalism is only a means of “regulating conflict.” The
Northern Ireland case challenges this claim, as it demonstrates that consociationalism is not only
decreasing the will of political leaders to resort to violence, but it gradually entrenches the notion
of democracy as the only viable means for realizing long-term political goals as well. The
political trajectory of Northern Ireland, ever since the Sinn Fein party decided to participate in
the democratic system, can be characterized by what political historian James Mahoney calls
“path dependency.” Mahoney’s idea of path dependence is “characterized [by] specifically those
historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event
chains that have deterministic properties.” In using this general argument, we can see how
contingent events can alter Northern Ireland’s political trajectory. The contingent event in this
case is the Sinn Fein party’s decision to participate in the elections. This event initiated the
gradual “self-reinforcing sequence” of events that led to the present political environment.
Mahoney’s notion of self-reinforcing sequences are “characterized by the formation and long-
term reproduction of a given institutional pattern,” which in this case, would be the long-term
reproduction of entrenching robust democratic institutions that are effective and inclusive of all
ethno-national parties inside Northern Ireland. As it has already been stipulated in this essay,
Sinn Fein’s desire to resort to violence has significantly decreased compared to just a couple of
decades ago.

There is evidence to suggest that if Afghanistan adopted a consociational system of
democracy, comparable to that in Northern Ireland, it would follow a similar political trajectory
as well. The incentives of the political system (by virtue of its structure as a power-sharing
system) will encourage ethno-national parties to participate. Over time, as each ethno-national
party exercises some power and people of various ethnic groups feel that they influence the
system, the voices of moderate leaders in each ethno-national bloc can be strengthened. As a
result, violent radicals will be sidelined by the effectiveness of the democratic system in helping
ethno-national groups achieve their aims.
Conclusion

When Afghanistan remains politically stable, it will no longer be a haven for terrorists to operationalize their activities. Furthermore, the livelihood of the people (who have suffered more than their share of hardship given the effects of three decades of war) will also improve, as security and social services develop. However, these things require strong state institutions, and for strong institutions to emerge, political actors must be willing to adhere to the rules and regulations of the state.

However, in deeply divided societies like Northern Ireland and Afghanistan, it is likely that the political actors will form political parties based on ethno-national lines. When this happens, the political system will neither reward only the few big parties nor marginalize all others. Such a system would never elicit any positive response from parties who know they have no stake in winning. Thus, consociational systems encourage parties in deeply divided societies to take the initial step in agreeing to participate in the system. This step can only occur if the leaders of these parties know that they can gain power in the executive. The case studies conducted in this essay showed how similar the current conditions and “identification matrices” in Afghanistan are to those in Northern Ireland a few decades ago. As well, the contingent event that altered Northern Ireland’s political trajectory from a deeply divided society to a democratic society with political parties based on ethno-national identities exemplifies the ability of consociational system to remedy ethnic violence. Given the extent of similarities with Afghanistan, should a consociational system be implemented in this country, there is strong evidence to suggest that it will be effective in reducing, and potentially eliminating, ethnic violence as means of pursuing political goals.

9  Ibid, 291.
13  Ibid.
16  Ibid, 695.
18  Ibid, 357-64.
20  Ibid
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
25  Ibid.
27  Ibid, 256-6.
34  Ibid, 513.

52
Bibliography


Smart Aid: Innovating the Concept of Development

Ali Tejpar

In response to critiques of current foreign aid distribution practices failing to achieve human development goals, scholars have argued for an alternative aid system. The concept of ‘smart aid’ seeks to improve the foreign aid system through fostering equitable and sustainable growth by means of selectively addressing locally determined development goals. Scholars, such as William Easterly, argue that the current top-down structures of foreign aid result in mismanaged funds that do not align with grassroots issues or agendas. Dambisa Moyo, a prominent international development economist, has also been a vocal critic of foreign aid; in claiming that aid regimes today have resulted in the formation of kleptocracies throughout various regions of Africa. The massive flows of international finance between the global North and South have resulted in a systemic lack of ‘good governance,’ through failing to address human development goals in favour of facilitating economic objectives. As such, smart aid focuses on the two central principles of feedback and accountability, to rectify the failures of current aid regimes and account for the self-identified development issues of aid recipients. By working with recipient communities, smart aid provides the foundation to fund innovative solutions to local problems relating to health, education, and human development. The primacy of both feedback and accountability, as part of the smart aid paradigm, intends to ensure that human development goals are reached by means of community mobilization and monitoring. By shifting the focus of development onto local communities, communal solutions can be implemented to address self-identified human development issues. The concept of smart aid therefore provides an opportunity to break from traditional aid practices, while better seeking to improve the basic standards of living in developing countries.

Introduction

The dominant forms of foreign aid today have been criticized for their inability to foster human development and truly improve the lives of those affected by abject poverty and destitution. In response, a number of scholars have emphasized the need to reform the current system to effectively, and more efficiently, use aid resources to institute sustainable services to meet the basic needs of the ultra-poor. This investigation will provide an evaluation of the current system of foreign aid, its effect on ‘good governance,’ theories of ‘smart aid’ and its applications and the role of donor agencies in the future. This paper will argue that, with close attention to recipients through accountability and feedback, foreign aid can become ‘smart aid,’ in order to better reach human development goals. It is clear, however, that this demands greater
transparency and pragmatism of aid agencies in their work with existing state institutions of developing states, wherever this may be possible, and with local communities as well.

Foreign aid, or ‘official development assistance’ (ODA), refers to “flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent.”\(^1\) Aid can be provided either bilaterally from government-to-government or multilaterally via international institutions, such as UN agencies or the World Bank. Thus, donors refer to both governments and the aforementioned institutions. Recipients can include specific communities or whole governments in developing states. The scope of this paper’s argument will limit foreign aid to multilateral channels and limit donors to international institutions, while regarding recipients to include governments and communities in regions affected by poverty. The scope of this paper is based on the notions that “bilateral ODA donors tie their own self-interest to the aid that they allocate to recipient countries,” while “recipient states are perceived to be much more willing to accept counsel from [international organizations] than from other governments directly, which underscores multilateral aid’s relative effectiveness as compared to bilateral ODA.”\(^2\)

Smart aid, conceived as a result of an international Commission for Africa, seeks to rectify the faults of the current aid system after the onslaught of harsh criticisms regarding the existing uses of foreign aid. Despite the challenges in effective uses of foreign aid, scholars underline that aid can play a significant role in fostering human development — defined as “improving economic or social well-being in developing countries” through basic systems of health care, education, security and other standard of life indexes.\(^3\) The concept of ‘smart aid’ is centered on the need to foster “sustainable, equitable growth” through applying aid selectively in a “close understanding of national, historical, social, and especially political contexts.”\(^4\) It also seeks “the achievement of locally determined development goals... [by facilitating] the emergence of enterprising private and public sectors, as well as stronger systems of accountability to protect them.”\(^5\)
The current system of foreign aid

The purpose of ODA is based on the distribution of funds to promote ‘development’ in developing states: understood in the context of dominant paradigms as seeking to increase “recipient country gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth rates.” Issues arise with the neglect of other significant areas, such as those focused on human development; areas which also include “minimising inequality or maximising poverty reduction; ...non-income factors such as starvation, education, health, biodiversity, democracy, or stability; and the maximising of aid flows [through] individual donor agencies among other goals.” Nevertheless, foreign aid has been allocated based on a variety of models that project outcomes of growth and development. These various discredited theories have been based on notions that poverty is the result of a ‘poverty trap,’ which can only be alleviated by a large inflow of aid to the governments of poor countries from that of wealthier countries to fill a ‘financing gap’ for these countries. Thus far, over US$2.3 trillion has been spent in foreign aid over the last fifty years with a record of minimal growth in recipient African countries. Critics have condemned the inappropriate use of foreign aid as “a pernicious force that breeds corruption, deters democracy and good governance and ultimately impedes economic growth.”

William Easterly, a Professor of Economics at New York University, is critical of the failure of international organizations to successfully and efficiently administer aid. He claims that the issue is a result of “top-down solutions developed and imposed by outsiders” that lacked accountability and feedback from target groups. He is also critical of the trend in aid agencies to “espouse the same list of poverty goals, such as health, education, infrastructure development, etc.” and in doing so, “each manages to effectively achieve nothing, while obscuring actual results.” Easterly scathingly refers to this recurring phenomenon in aid agencies as “one of the worst incentive systems since mankind started walking upright.” This is only one of the critiques that smart aid seeks to address in rectifying the many instances of ineffective foreign aid use by donor organizations. ‘Good governance,’ in seeking to emphasize accountability and pragmatism, is not only a goal applicable to recipient governments, but also to the work and endeavours of donor agencies and institutions.
Foreign aid and ‘good governance’

Dambisa Moyo, a prominent international development economist, has also been vocal about her criticisms of foreign aid and its contribution to facilitating corruption in recipient governments. She asserts that as developing states become more dependent on aid, investors become uncomfortable with putting capital in aid-dependant regions and thus, domestic and foreign investments decrease. She also describes how aid quickly reduces the link between citizens and the state, as governments do not have to rely on citizens for revenue, which reduces their accountability to public need. The mass flows of aid to African countries have also resulted in the rise of kleptocracies, as positions of leadership become coveted by a range of groups. This leads to social unrest and civil wars for control of the government. The consistent flow of aid also decreases the incentive of governments to seek long-term financial planning because these inflows become seen as a “permanent and unlimited source of income.” Hence, it is clear that aid has essentially contributed to the lack of ‘good governance’ as a result of existing ODA strategies and methods.

Thus far, the current system of ODA has been negligent in ensuring that the aid provided is distributed to state leaders and governments that are accountable to their citizens’ needs. In 2002, over US$9 billion in foreign aid had been given to “the world’s 25 most undemocratic government rulers (out of 199 countries the World Bank rated on democracy),” while “the world’s 25 most corrupt countries got US$9.4 billion in foreign aid.” Nevertheless, arguments that claim that governments in Africa “simply need to behave [themselves], to allow market forces to operate without interference by corrupt rulers”, [fail] to explain why...both the well and poorly governed in Sub-Saharan Africa” are equally affected by persistent poverty. It is clear that the onus of effective aid distribution and the need for ‘good governance’ falls primarily on donor agencies in particular. The principles of smart aid thus seek to change the focus of aid from facilitating economic growth to fostering real, measureable human development in areas affected by abject poverty.

The principles of ‘smart aid’

What differentiates smart aid from the existing concepts of foreign aid is its enhanced focus on two main criteria: feedback and accountability, especially in donor-funded projects and investments seeking to foster human development. Easterly discusses the fallacies of foreign aid
by explaining that the “lack of feedback is one of the most critical flaws in existing aid. It comes about because of the near-invisibility of efforts and results by aid agencies in distant parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{20} He discusses this trend through the case study of operations in the Bolivian mountains by the International Monetary Fund, USAID, the British Department of International Development, and the World Bank:

\begin{quote}
None of the agencies is responsible for a particular outcome. They jointly affect what happens to economic development in Bolivia. When something goes wrong in Bolivia, like the economic and political crisis in 1999-2005, after years of effort by these agencies, which one is to blame? We don’t know, so no one agency is accountable. This weakens the incentive of agencies to deliver results.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Easterly further argues that aid can still play a major role in benefitting the lives of the poor, but only when “individual aid agents have the incentive to deliver tangible services for which they can be held accountable.”\textsuperscript{22} The pillars of feedback and accountability essentially seek to address the immediate need to focus aid efforts on achieving basic human development goals, rather than inadvertently contributing to the propagation of corruption in recipient governments.

To effectively promote accountability and feedback, development scholars have proposed a number of suggestions to ensure that aid agencies consistently give aid in a pragmatic manner:

\begin{quote}
Evaluation efforts could include surveys of the poor, just asking the poor whether they got what they most needed and whether they are better off because of an aid intervention, and holding the aid agencies accountable for the results. Hold surveys of the population’s well-being both before and after the aid program to compare the results on specific outcomes. More rigorous evaluation could use the randomized controlled trial methods which have been successfully applied in many settings to see which interventions work.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

This would require that the status quo, in “large international bureaucracies giving aid to large national government bureaucracies,” change its focus to providing aid on regional or local levels, in order to better assess the results of providing ‘smart aid.’\textsuperscript{24} This is based on the notion that empowering individuals, through achieving basic human development goals, fosters the development of “capable institutions at subnational (and non-governmental)” levels. This, in turn, facilitates a strong civil society, which is necessary to counter corruption and increase government accountability to its citizens.\textsuperscript{25}
Furthermore, feedback serves to provide donor agencies with evaluation regarding projects at regional and local levels. The benefits of promoting accountability of “donor-funded projects is as likely to be as much in knowledge generation and institution strengthening as it is in financing an activity that would not otherwise occur.” Particularly, scholars view smart aid, through the financing of programs that “support the inclusion of randomised designs and other ‘gold plate’ evaluation mechanisms in project design,” as a means of distributing the knowledge of successful projects that support future development decision making. Thus, in promoting accountability in the actions of aid agencies, human development goals can be reached, and feedback from affected populaces can influence the improvement of existing and future projects. Smart aid also seeks to empower local and regional institutions to overcome the issues of poor governance in the state, while indirectly contributing to the creation of a civil society.

Applications of ‘smart aid’

In tandem with the encouragement of accountability and feedback, smart aid seeks to use traditional multilateral donor agencies to fund “better-designed [private] projects even in weak institutional environments” and government spending in areas with the “presence of strong institutions,” in the spirit of selectivity and pragmatism in aid allocation. Recipients, including that of regional private (non-governmental) institutions or strong government institutions (where possible), will receive smart aid to support targeted projects. Feedback will be received to ensure that aid is effectively used for human development goals.

Easterly, among other scholars, is particularly supportive in the funding of private institutions to meet human development goals in regions affected by poverty. As a key example, he describes the prevalence of diarrhea as a significant health problem in the poorest regions of India. Without proper treatment, diarrhea can lead to dehydration. This can lead to the impaired development of infants, if not death, as a result of dehydration-induced shock. One of the main causes of diarrhea is from the spread of bacteria and viruses during the preparation of food with unwashed hands. To combat the vast number of deaths and illnesses caused by this health issue, Hindustan Level Limited (HLL), a regional subsidiary of Unilever, sold soap to regional communities, as hand-washing is critical to prevent the spread of bacteria and viruses. HLL understood that it would be difficult to change habits in poor regions of India, particularly as people were not well informed about how diseases were transmitted and only washed their hands.
“if they were visibly dirty, not when their hands were covered with invisible germs after using the latrine or changing a baby’s diaper.”

To encourage the use of soap, this organization would have to commit to educating individuals in the region:

To realize this market potential, HLL had to find ways of gaining the poor’s trust in its health-promoting product. Working with government, aid agencies, and NGOs, it started educational programs. HLL started a program called Lifebuoy Swasthya Chetna, or Lifebuoy Glowing Health, which sent out two-person teams to present to schoolchildren how they could avoid stomach, eye, and wound infections by washing with Lifebuoy soap, and enlisted the village doctors to speak to the children’s parents about how hand-washing with soap can prevent diarrhea and other health complications.

In doing so, HLL was successful in both increasing the sales revenue of soap, as well as significantly decreasing infant mortality in the poorest communities of India. In meeting human development goals, regional institutions found success where typical ODA transfers could not.

Another example of the success of regional initiatives is the All India Institute for Hygiene and Public Health’s endeavour to combat AIDS. The spread of AIDS in India, along with the heavily stigmatized culture of prostitution, has resulted in the development of a prostitute subculture to avoid harassment and discrimination. In order to minimize the spread of HIV/AIDS, Dr. Jana, head of the operation, came upon a key strategy “by trial and error, with feedback from the prostitutes.” By training a group of twelve prostitutes to educate other sex workers about the danger of AIDS and the use of condoms to prevent its spread, condom use in the region of Sonagachi increased rapidly. By wearing green medical coats when “engaged in public health work, they attained greater status” in the area and, as a result, HIV incidence in the region was lowered to six percent from fifty percent in other districts. This project led to other “unexpected consequences,” in increasing the confidence of peer educators and enhancing media attention to the issue. This led to the creation of a union to “campaign for legalization of prostitutions, a reduction in police harassment, and to organize festivals and health fairs.” Dr. Jana’s initiative and its success are credited to relying heavily on feedback from target individuals, in order to more effectively work towards minimizing the health issue at hand.

Another application of smart aid is the use of specialized partnership funds (SPFs), which have “expanded rapidly over recent years.” They perform two main functions: raising and pooling funds for specific projects, as well as disbursing grants to “local implementing agents
(from both the public and private sectors),” while relying heavily on feedback from target groups. Their successes lie in their ability to work with regional institutions, “allowing charitable giving to operate along market-like lines.” Working with regional institutions also focuses on specific human development goals, and emphasizes selectivity in choosing which communities work with public institutions. Projects have included GlobalGiving, Kiva, GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund, all backed by “astute campaigning” and innovative models to “rapidly mobilize and disburse relatively large volumes of funds.” Thus far, GAVI Alliance has reported that it has “protected a total of 213 million children with new and underused vaccines and prevented 3.4 million future deaths” between 2000 and 2008. The Global Fund has stated that it has provided an estimated twenty percent of donor funding to HIV/AIDS campaigns in Africa, sixty-four percent of malaria campaigns and seventy percent for tuberculosis. Kiva has also contributed over US$85 million in microfinance loans in over 29 developing countries, to stimulate local innovation and meet human development goals through achieving higher quality of life standards.

Smart aid, in taking advantage of regional and local private (non-governmental) institutions, has a number of advantages that traditional ODA lacks. The aforementioned approaches effectively shorten the “aid chain by making one of either source or host country intermediaries redundant. In doing so, they aim to provide greater and more direct feedback between donor and recipients.” In focusing on local innovation to meet direct human development needs, smart aid “reduces political interference, enhances transparency, promotes specialisation and allows greater competition among implementing actors, thereby improving performance.” Traditional ODA given to a kleptocracy would do little to improve the livelihoods of citizens, yet giving the same aid to a “cross-national effort to control [health issues], when ably backed by governments and NGOs and strongly supported by the local population, can make a real difference to the quality of life of hundreds of thousands.” In states with fairly capable institutions, meeting with target populations and financing projects in partnership with local governments can be effective in improving the quality of life of locals. This is exemplified in the case of HLL’s multidimensional campaign for effective hand washing in India. In regions with weak institutional capacity, project-specific lending by private institutions can meet human development standards “where it is likely that there would be no project at all in the absence of aid.” In doing so, and by empowering local innovation, smart aid
also contributes to the ability of civil society institutions to provide citizens with services that weak governments would not otherwise provide.

While smart aid seeks to rectify the failures of traditional ODA, it nevertheless fails to address a number of development areas. By seeking to fund private institutions on a local and regional level, it is not well suited to “financing complex, long-term challenges such as public institution-and capacity-building.” This significant area fails to be addressed by proponents of smart aid. Hence, smart aid seeks to directly meet human development needs of local populations in areas of abject poverty, but it neither contributes to the propagation of poor governance, nor does it actively promote good governance through institution building. As previously mentioned, smart aid utilizes institutional capabilities of local governments, wherever possible, through projects that use multidimensional approaches.

The role of donor agencies in the future

Current private projects and institutions working towards human development goals in developing states have been shown to succeed where traditional foreign aid has failed to. Proponents of smart aid emphasize the role that donor agencies, particularly multilateral and international organizations, such as the World Bank and UN agencies, have in supporting recipients, such as regional private (non-governmental) institutions and capable government institutions, in seeking to meet human development goals. By altering the focus of traditional ODA from governments that fail to improve the livelihoods of their citizens, to capable regional actors that seek to uphold accountability and retrieve feedback on their projects, foreign aid can become smart aid.

Easterly is particularly vocal in supporting the use of traditional foreign aid to fund “small-scale non-profit organizations...where aid agencies receive feedback and are made accountable for their results.” He, among a number of other scholars, supports the necessity of feedback and accountability in the endeavours of the aforementioned projects and regional institutions. Successful projects, such as those conducted by the Hindustan Level Limited, the All India Institute for Hygiene and Public Health and the vast number of ‘specialized partnership funds,’ have all contributed to the achievement of human development goals through working with target groups and receiving feedback on effective methods to foster sustainable change. By
working from the ‘bottom-up,’ target demographics can be consulted to determine the most efficient methods of improving the basic standards of living in developing states.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that smart aid has the possibility to see success where traditional ODA has failed, particularly in seeking to work alongside local communities to achieve human development goals that improve the quality of life of those affected by abject poverty. It is also effective in consulting with target groups to seek better methods to achieve goals, particularly in the case of Dr. Jana’s endeavour to minimize the spread of AIDS in regions of India. Smart aid has the capability to achieve the results that traditional foreign aid has sought to achieve for decades. If it is to encourage sustainable development, “it must facilitate the emergence of enterprising private and public sectors as well as stronger systems of accountability to protect them.”

In doing so, smart aid and subsequent projects enhance the “emergence of robust civil societies” in meeting human development needs where government institutions have failed. This is a necessary criterion to facilitate an accountable government.

In altering the focus of the current system of foreign aid to turn to local initiatives and projects that actively consult target communities, feedback and accountability can ensure that aid is directed to human development needs. Smart aid, in asserting the necessity of transparency and pragmatism in effective aid use, avoids indirectly facilitating government corruption in developing countries. By supporting public and private enterprise to better the quality of life of those affected by abject poverty, smart aid can contribute to human development more efficiently than foreign aid has done in the past. Examples and case studies of successful projects undertaken by regional institutions, and supported by capable governments, have shown that donors can work to the benefit of intended recipients with the underlying principles of smart aid. While smart aid may not contribute as effectively to public institutions and capacity building, it can increase the basic standards of living in developing countries. Regardless, as smart aid begins to play a more prominent role in developing communities, it is important that the diverse political, cultural, social and economic contexts of these regions be recognized and that feedback and accountability with recipients be encouraged to implement projects efficiently and appropriately.


Brown, 143.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Easterly, 18.


Easterly, 6.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. 25.

Ibid.

Kenny, 2008.

Ibid.

Kenny, 339.

Ibid, 340.

Easterly, 8.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Easterly, 10.

Ibid.

Easterly, 10.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Jones, 8.
48 Jones, 12.
49 Kenny, 337.
50 Ibid, 338.
51 Jones, 8.
52 John and Storr, 132.
53 Joseph and Gillies, 14.
54 Ibid.
Bibliography


From the Polls to the Streets: Disaffection and Extra-Democratic Participation in Latin America

Brandon Pasternak

Since the mid-to-late twentieth century, democracies have experienced two distinct, yet interconnected phenomena: a paradox of political attitudes and political participation. The disaffection hypothesis claims that the increase in dissatisfaction with democratic institutions and government performance is the reason for the growth of protest politics, what can be called “extra-democratic political participation,” and that citizens who engage in these activities are less involved in voting and campaigning. However, data from Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela suggests that these propositions prove invalid for the Latin American context. Although the growth of extra-democratic participation poses a legitimate threat to democracy, a more constructive approach focuses on the potential for modifying democratic institutions to accommodate these new dynamics. The real work that needs to be done is not making citizens more satisfied with the functionality of democratic channels, but adapting a representative democracy in response to an electorate’s growing preference for more direct participation.

Since the mid-to-late twentieth century, democracies have been experiencing two distinct, yet interconnected phenomena: a paradox of political attitudes and political participation. Citizens have an overwhelmingly supportive attitude towards the idea of democracy as a political system, yet they are increasingly dissatisfied with political authorities and institutions – how their democracies are functioning in practice. Similarly, despite a decline in conventional forms of political participation, e.g., campaigning and voting, there has been a dramatic increase in the relatively unconventional “protest politics.” Moreover, the correlation between attitudes and participation presented in the literature suggests that these two phenomena, to whatever degree, might be related. Using data from Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, this study explores the extent to which positive attitudes towards democracy correspond to increased involvement in conventional forms of political participation, relative to the unconventional alternatives. More specifically, it argues that the disaffection hypothesis – claiming that the growth of unconventional participation is due to dissatisfaction with democracy – proves invalid for these Latin American cases.

Brandon Pasternak is a fourth year student studying Political Studies and Economics at Queen’s University.
The argument proceeds as follows: part one begins with a presentation of the literature on political attitudes and political participation, connecting the two concepts with reference to the disaffection hypothesis; part two explains the merits of observing the Latin American countries selected as case studies, and describes the methodology used; part three analyzes the results and the validity of the disaffection hypothesis; part four discusses the relevance of these results for the participation paradox; finally, part five concludes by suggesting the greater significance of this study for democratization in general.

I - Political Attitudes, Political Participation and the Disaffection Hypothesis

The most well-known discussion of political attitudes is connected to Almond and Verba’s analysis of political culture, which is defined as “political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its various parts…." Support for democracy is arguably one of the most important political attitudes: for a democratic system to survive, popular support is necessary. Expanding on this, Easton identifies three main objects of political support: political authorities and the incumbents in office, the institutions of governance and the national political community. Easton also distinguishes between diffuse support – a relatively stable orientation towards the nation’s political system or regime as a whole – and specific support – based on an evaluation of government performance. Although the indicator that will be used to evaluate the attitudes-towards-democracy variable – satisfaction with democratic performance – focuses on specific support, this study also incorporates diffuse support for democracy to provide some balance.

Concerning political participation, Verba and Nie provide the best description of what participation entails: “those activities...directed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take, [including voting and campaigning].” They develop a classification of six modes of participation according to the various activities that citizens undertake, such as voting, contacting officials and campaigning. Verba and Nie are thus explicit about only emphasizing those activities internal to the electoral institutions of democracy. Political protest, for example, is excluded because it operates outside of democratic channels.

Following WWII, the prevailing consensus was that any form of political action external to the democratic process – whether riots, protests or boycotts – was marginal and unnecessary, supposedly characteristic of a previous, less-developed stage of democratization that advanced,
industrial Western societies had already emerged from. However, recent trends have contributed to a shift in focus. The decline of interest in political parties and escalation of unorthodox forms of political participation that do not fit within the Verba and Nie classification has led others – notably Barnes and Kasse – to broaden the previously narrow conceptual boundaries of participation.

Barnes and Kasse create a distinction between the conventional forms of political participation described by Verba and Nie – e.g., voting – and “unconventional political participation,” including demonstrations and land occupation. In doing so, they classify these nontraditional activities as part of political participation. However, in more recent years, the utility of such a distinction between conventional and unconventional participation has been questioned. Although the significance of demonstrations might mean that it no longer makes sense to exclude such activities from the concept of political participation, the fact that they have become mainstream, Norris argues, suggests that giving them a separate class of their own as “unconventional” within the broader category of participation may no longer be appropriate. Perhaps the heterogeneity of participation should be ignored because both traditional forms and protest politics are significant.

Despite the validity of this argument, there is still merit in using the distinction, at least for this analysis. First, separating the two groups of activities makes it possible to identify the existence of opposing dynamics: the decline of partisan politics and increase in protest politics. Suggesting that political participation is waning because of a weakening partisan link does not properly consider the growth of other forms of political involvement. Indeed, party membership and voting may not be sufficient conditions for healthy democracy. Democratic stability requires meaningful, critical engagement, and other forms of participation may facilitate this in a way that voting does not. This is especially true, as Howe notes, given the “sensibilities of today’s younger generation.” More importantly, breaking down the concept of political participation by distinguishing between the conventional and unconventional is necessary for this analysis, as it will allow for an examination of the ways in which the relationship between attitudes towards democracy and participation may differ depending on the type of activity in question. One could still argue that even if a sub-division of political participation into these two categories is merited, the term “unconventional” does not portray the increasingly conventional nature of protest politics. Indeed, the difference between these two forms of participation is no
longer based on significance. Even if partisan politics has suffered, it still remains significant, in that it forms the foundation of the democratic system. Rather, the most relevant difference at present is the extent to which activities are channeled through the institutions of democracy, or whether they are performed externally. For this reason, the conventional-unconventional distinction will be referred to as the intra-democratic–extra-democratic distinction from here on in.

The connection between attitudes towards democracy and political participation is predominant within the literature. Verba and Nie argue that participating in politics has the potential to foster satisfaction with one’s government. Inversely, the influence of positive attitudes towards the democratic system or satisfaction with its practical successes has an influence on the extent to which one participates. Although it might be evident that psychological perceptions of politics affect political behavior, it is less obvious whether positive attitudes entice more participation or less, and what form of response is provoked. It is precisely this second question that the disaffection hypothesis is concerned with.

According to Ted Gurr, the growth of protest politics is indicative of an electorate growing increasingly disenchanted with the conventional channels of influencing government decision-making, preferring new progressive methods of demonstrating its discontent instead. The disaffection hypothesis proposes that (1) increased dissatisfaction with the performance of representative democracy has led to the intensification of unconventional political participation. Demonstrators and protestors, then, should be more dissatisfied with democratic performance than their voting and campaigning peers. Additionally, (2) those involved in extra-democratic participation should be less involved in intra-democratic activities, and vice-versa. Despite having been discredited in previous research, the disaffection hypothesis deserves even greater attention now because of the continued growth of protest politics in the years since these studies were conducted. Even though Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst’s 2005 analysis of Belgium concluded that it still remains invalid, it is nevertheless worth observing the hypothesis’ merits in the Latin American context as well.
II - The Merits of Studying Latin America & Methodology

Latin America has a vibrant political history, in which protest politics has played a significant role. As part of Huntington’s third wave of democratization in the 1970s, Latin American states experienced a tumultuous transition from authoritarian regimes to representative governments. However, given the relative stagnation of democratic growth since 1992, an updated analysis of current attitudes towards the democratic system is necessary. Furthermore, extra-democratic participation has been extremely pertinent to the Latin American political landscape in recent years. Chilean student protests in opposition to an “unfair” education system have remained potent since their beginning in 2011. Parallel movements have spread to Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela as well. In 2013, one million Argentines marched in disapproval of government efforts to revitalize the economy, thousands of Colombian coffee growers took to the streets to demand greater subsidies, Peruvian workers rallied for better labour rights, and clashes between supporters of the political opposition and the police following Venezuelan elections left seven dead and sixty injured. These developments provoke an investigation into the relationship between the prevalence of extra-democratic activities and democratic attitudes. A cursory observation of these events might seem to support the disaffection hypothesis. However, a closer analysis of data from these countries is required to truly assess the attitudes-participation relationship.

It is necessary to outline the methodology employed in this study, as well as explain why Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela were chosen beyond the fact that they experienced protests during the time of writing. First, the data used comes from the Latinobarómetro’s 2008 survey. The year 2008 was chosen simply because it was the most recent year in which all of the required data was available. Second, two variables are analyzed: attitudes towards democracy and political participation. Since the disaffection hypothesis deals explicitly with satisfaction, attitudes towards democracy will be represented primarily by “satisfaction with democracy” (here on in “satisfaction”). However, “support for democracy” (here on in “support”) will also be considered, at least minimally, to provide some indication of the prevalence of diffuse support. To measure support, respondents were asked whether (a) “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” if (b) “under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one” or if (c) “for people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.” For satisfaction, respondents were asked: “in
general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [nation]?" Together, these two indicators provide a relatively accurate depiction of both diffuse support for democracy as an ideal system of governance and specific support for democratic performance.

Political participation will be assessed according to its extra-democratic and intra-democratic sub-types. Intra-democratic participation will be represented by the question: “did you vote in the last presidential election?” Extra-democratic activities will be represented by the question: “tell me, for each [political activity], if you have ever done any of them, if you would ever do any of them, or if you would never do any of them [italicizes added]?” In recognizing that some extra-democratic activities are “more radical” than others, data for the prevalence of riots and prevalence of occupying land, buildings or factories will be included.

Although the general results for each variable (e.g., a majority in each country were dissatisfied with democracy) will be noted, the focus is on the relationships between variables. There are four in particular: (1) Satisfaction and voting, (2) satisfaction and rioting, (3) satisfaction and land occupation, (4) voting and rioting. How will these relationships be assessed? Using the satisfaction-voting association as an example, the relationship will be observed in two ways: first with satisfaction as the dependent variable and voting as the independent variable, and then by switching the two. In the first case, the group of respondents who identified as not having voted is observed to see what percentage of them were very satisfied, following which the group of respondents who identified as having voted will also be observed to see if a greater or lesser percentage of them were very satisfied. The second case would involve doing the opposite. If both cases are mutually re-enforcing (i.e., having voted means being more satisfied, and being more satisfied means having voted), then there is either a positive or negative correlation between the two variables. If this is not the case, the results will be classified as mixed. Furthermore, even if the strength of each relationship differs between countries, what matters more is whether there is consistency in the direction of correlation. Although multivariate regression analysis would have been more rigorous than the type of comparison employed here, it was not feasible given the nature of the data available.

The disaffection hypothesis will be tested according to its two main propositions, which can be called DH1 and DH2. DH1 suggests that the correlation between satisfaction and voting should be positive, and that the correlation between satisfaction and rioting or land occupying
should be negative. Additionally, DH2 indicates that the voting-rioting relationship should have a negative correlation.\(^{35}\) If the trends are similar for each country, the results will be more affirmative.

Moreover, to demonstrate that these similarities could not be easily attributed to other factors, four countries were chosen with a relative divergence in geographical location, political perceptions and economic outlook. Geographically, the four countries span almost the entirety of Latin America’s vertical distance from south to north. Relative to other Latin American countries, Peru has the least number of citizens who are “very satisfied” with democracy, Venezuela has the most, and Argentina and Colombia fall somewhere in between.\(^{36}\) Although there is variation in the levels of satisfaction, this does not limit the possibility that the relationship between satisfaction and participation can still be the same across cases. Finally, economic outlook varies greatly between the four countries. Venezuela has the second-highest number of citizens in Latin America who think that economic problems are being solved in the country, Argentina has the lowest, and Peru and Colombia are close to Argentina and Venezuela respectively.\(^{37}\) The existence of these differences makes it more difficult to claim that similarities in the relationship between participation and satisfaction across countries are due to similarities in geographical location, the levels of satisfaction themselves or perceptions of the economy.\(^{38}\)

### III - Results

#### General Trends

Observing the cohort reveals four general trends (see Figure 1). First, a majority of respondents in each country expressed support for democracy as “preferable to any other kind of government,” ranging from Venezuela at 83.5% to Peru at 50.6%. Second, most respondents were largely unsatisfied with democratic performance, with Venezuela being the most satisfied at 49.6% – although still a minority – and Peru the least satisfied at 16.9%. Generally, the countries with higher support for democracy also had higher satisfaction. Third, a very strong majority of respondents voted in the last presidential elections. Peru had the highest turnout at 84.9%, and Colombia the lowest at 69.7%. Finally, although between 87.8% (Venezuela) and 96.2% (Colombia) of respondents claimed that they would never riot, an even greater percentage said that they would never occupy land, buildings or factories, ranging from 90.4% in Venezuela to 97.2% in Colombia. This contradicts the logic that more-radical activities would receive less
support. As with attitudes, the countries with lower support for rioting also had the lowest support for occupying land.

**Figure 1: General Trends on Attitudes Towards Democracy and Political Participation (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes Towards Democracy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support</strong> for democracy - “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Satisfaction</strong> with democracy - “Very or rather satisfied”</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Participation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intra-Democratic</strong> - “Voted in the last presidential elections”</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Extra-Democratic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Would never riot”</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Would never occupy land, buildings or factories”</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Most Effective Way to Change Things”</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voting</strong></td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Protesting</strong></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarómetro Database

Although the prevalence of rioting and occupying land does not determine the prevalence of other forms of extra-democratic participation, it is nevertheless interesting that the large disapproval for rioting and occupying land seems to contradict the increasing number of public demonstrations – even if they were not “riots” per say – that these countries have experienced in past years. Even when considering another survey question asking what was the “most effective way...you can contribute to change” given the options of voting or protesting, there was still significantly greater approval for voting compared to protesting. This might be because of a disjuncture between how individuals perceive the efficiency of different influential actions and how they actually act, as individuals may protest because they feel they have no other choice even if they perceive it to be less effective. Nevertheless, when taken as a whole, the negligent support for extra-democratic participation in the data is puzzling.

Moreover, this cursory look at general trends presents two interesting results that seem to hint at the disaffection hypothesis’ invalidity. First, Venezuela has the greatest support and
greatest satisfaction (even if a majority is still dissatisfied). Despite DH1 claiming that Venezuela should have the greatest amount of voters and lowest propensity for rioting and occupation as a result, the opposite is true – it has the third lowest number of voters and greatest propensity for rioting and occupation. Second, DH2 assumes that the most riot/occupation-prone population should have the lowest voters and, by extension, that the population with the lowest propensity to demonstrate should have the greatest number of voters. On the contrary, although Colombian respondents were the least prone to riot or occupy land, they also voted least often. To better test these observations and investigate the extent to which any correlations exist, the relationships between these variables are analyzed.

Four Relationships

Satisfaction and voting. With the exception of Venezuela, the percentage of respondents in the voting group who were very or rather satisfied was greater than that of those in the non-voting group. Inversely, in moving from the not-at-all-satisfied group to the very-satisfied group, the percentage of respondents who voted increased. Venezuela was the exception once again, as well as Peru. Therefore, there is a definite positive correlation between satisfaction and voting for Argentina and Colombia, there is a negative correlation for Venezuela, and Peru’s is mixed.

Satisfaction and occupying land, buildings or factories. With the exception of Argentina, moving from the would-never-occupy group to the have-occupied group increases the percentage of those who are very or rather satisfied. Inversely, in all cases, the group of respondents that was more satisfied also had a greater percentage of respondents that had occupied. There is a definite positive correlation between satisfaction and occupation for Colombia, Peru and even Venezuela, while Argentina’s is mixed.

Satisfaction and rioting. In shifting to the more-radical extra-democratic activity of rioting, Argentina’s correlation between satisfaction and extra-democratic participation changes from mixed to negative, Colombia’s and Peru’s both remain positive, and Venezuela’s goes from positive to mixed. If having two countries with positive correlations and two with negative correlations renders a relationship inconclusive at large, all three relationships thus far are at least more positive than negative. Comparing the two extra-democratic relationships across the four countries, the satisfaction-rioting correlation is on average more negative than that of satisfaction-occupying. This re-enforces the logic that more-radical activities would likely have
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-Democratic Satisfaction and Voting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on % of “very or rather satisfied” respondents by moving from No Vote to Yes Vote</td>
<td>+3.2*</td>
<td>+13.8</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-Effect on % of Yes Vote compared to No Vote respondents by moving from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”</td>
<td>+24.2</td>
<td>+37</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation:</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extra-Democratic Satisfaction and Occupying</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on % of “very or rather satisfied” respondents by moving from “would never do” to “have done”</td>
<td>-33.3</td>
<td>+20.9</td>
<td>+33.2</td>
<td>+8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-Effect on % of “have done” compared to “would never do” respondents by moving from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+21.2</td>
<td>+5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation:</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extra-Democratic Satisfaction and Rioting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on % of “very or rather satisfied” respondents by moving from “would never do” to “have done”</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>+14.6</td>
<td>+32.9</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-Effect on % of “have done” compared to “would never do” respondents by moving from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation:</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rioting and Voting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-Effect on % of Yes Vote compared to No Vote respondents by moving from “would never do” to “have done”</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>+14.1</td>
<td>+27.7</td>
<td>+12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-Effect on % of “have done” compared to “would never do” respondents by moving from No Vote to Yes Vote</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation:</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Moving from the “No Vote” to “Yes Vote” group of respondents, the percentage of respondents that are “very or rather satisfied” increases by x. A similar process is used for each category. Source: Latinobarómetro Database
less of a positive correlation with democratic satisfaction. However, the satisfaction-occupying relationship is, perhaps surprisingly, more positive than the satisfaction-voting relationship, since there are three positive results and one mixed in the former compared to only two positive, a mixed and a negative in the latter. Finally, the satisfaction-voting relationship is equally as positive as the satisfaction-rioting relationship. This indicates that the positive association between satisfaction with democracy and intra-democratic participation is not any stronger than the more-radical form of extra-democratic participation (rioting), and significantly less strong than occupying land.

Most important is whether this provides any indication of the disaffection hypothesis’ validity. For the less-radical extra-democratic activity of occupation, satisfaction with democracy and propensity to occupy are positively correlated in three of the four cases, the fourth being mixed. Even satisfaction and rioting are positively correlated in two of the four cases, with one mixed, making the relationship more positive than negative. Although DH1 may not be 100% invalid, the results point more in this direction.

*Rioting and voting.* There is a greater percentage of voters within the have-rioted group than in the would-never-riot group, except for Argentina. Inversely, moving from the non-voting group of respondents to the voting group, the percentage of respondents participating in riots increased in all cases except for Colombia’s. Although the correlation between rioting and voting is mixed for Argentina and Colombia, it is positive for Venezuela and Peru. This final relationship helps to assess DH2: individuals should be more likely to vote as they become less likely to riot. The results do not provide strong evidence for this: two cases have positive correlations, and two are mixed.

Generally, the results have suggested that the disaffection hypothesis does not apply resolutely to the Latin American cases chosen. If anything, the results are indicative of a positive relationship between satisfaction with democracy and extra-democratic participation, contrary to DH1. Thus, satisfaction does not appear to be a major factor in differentiating between types of participation. This does not, however, by any means suggest that some citizens do not protest because they are dissatisfied. Additionally, in opposition to DH2, respondents appear to be equally as likely to participate in democratic channels regardless of whether they participate in extra-democratic activities as well. Future research might improve upon these results by
incorporating more countries within the study and expanding upon a broader range of activities within the two categories of participation, including campaigning, signing petitions, protesting, boycotting, etc. Furthermore, the adoption of a more expansive study spanning multiple years – especially those since 2010 – and conditioning for the potential effect of short term political events will provide a more accurate depiction of the resiliency of these trends in the long term.

IV - The Paradox of Participation

Thus far, this study has concluded that the changing nature of political participation cannot be attributed to levels of satisfaction within the populace. However, it is worth briefly considering the broader significance of this paradox of participation. What does it mean for democracy if citizens are taking to the streets instead of turning up to the polls, and, more importantly, does the weak connection between dissatisfaction and protest alter the stakes involved?

Although there is a plethora of interpretations concerning what democracy entails, it is generally accepted that free and fair elections – the process by which public preferences are translated into governance – are at its core. Individuals influence politics by electing representatives, who in turn bring the constituents’ concerns to government to be addressed and, hopefully, resolved. This representative democracy, however, is only as strong as the functioning of its institutions, namely the electoral system. In order for its institutions to function, inputs are required: citizens need to vote, and would-be-representatives need to run for office. In essence, the stability and resilience of democracy requires participation – campaigning, voting, etc. What effect does extra-democratic participation have on democracy’s survival? There are two. First, the substitution effect has the potential to undermine the institutions of democracy if individuals, who only have a finite amount of time and energy, substitute the resources they invest into democratic participation for involvement in exterior channels. The decline of partisan politics relative to protest politics may seem to illustrate this substitution effect. However, Norris, Walgave and Van Aelst’s analysis of Belgium has indicated that “those who demonstrate are also more likely to be party members, not less.” This study of Latin American countries has also emphasized that demonstrating and voting are positively correlated. Therefore, these participation dynamics may falsely present the image of citizens turning from vote to protest as if
there was a rigid dichotomy between the two activities, when in reality citizens may be strongly involved in both.

However, the *symbolic* effects may be more toxic. Even if voting is not being substituted for protest, the potent presence of mass demonstrations within communities sends a symbolic message that democratic channels are not functioning properly, having a psychological effect on citizens with the potential to further alter political behavior. Does the fact that the presence of protest does not equate to a more dissatisfied public change this result? Practically speaking, democracy requires participants. Even if satisfied citizens participate by other means, the extent to which they avoid democratic channels has a negative effect. Beyond this, the symbolic effect of protests on citizens who are not engaged in politics is independent of whether or not the protestors themselves are satisfied.

The real paradox of the changing nature of political participation is not the polarizing dynamics themselves, but the fact that even though the relative growth of extra-democratic participation has the potential to weaken democracy, the growth of participation – as the life-blood of the democratic process – has the potential to strengthen democracy. If citizens are not apathetic, but engaged in politics even if “at the margins,” this energy could be harnessed and translated into participation in democratic institutions should trust in these channels increase. However, given the results presented here, it does not appear as if citizens can be brought back into the democratic spheres of participation by increasing their satisfaction with how these institutions function. Instead, as Dalton argues, “democratic governments need to accommodate the changing patterns of citizen politics,” enabling a greater responsiveness to new demands.\textsuperscript{43}

The real work that needs to be done is not making citizens more satisfied with the functionality of democratic channels, but rather adapting representative democracy to the demands of an electorate with changing values. Promoting opportunities for more direct democracy within the Latin American context may be a step in the right direction.

**V - Conclusion: Democratization Moving Forward**

A growing dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy has been paralleled by a growth in unconventional forms of political participation, what has been referred to as “extra-democratic” activities. The disaffection hypothesis has been used to draw a connection between these two trends, suggesting that dissatisfaction has led to a rise in protest politics, and that those
who are involved extra-democratically are less likely to be engaged in intra-democratic activities. However, a study of citizen satisfaction and involvement in voting, occupying land and rioting in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela has indicated that neither of these propositions prove valid for the Latin American context. More importantly, the perception that growth in protest politics poses a threat to democracy, although not entirely unfounded, assumes that citizen behavior, not the institutions of democracy themselves, are deviant. On the contrary, increased involvement in extra-democratic activity may be indicative of not dissatisfaction with democratic channels, but a greater desire for direct influence in politics. As Latin American countries continue to seek best-responses to these new citizen dynamics, the expansion of direct participation, whether through referendums or other measures, will likely be the next step in democratization for the region.

2 Pippa Norris, Stefan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst, "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" *Comparative Politics* 37 (2005), 190.


The data on support is presented, but the relationship between support and participation will not be assessed. This is because the results did not highlight any conclusive correlation between the two across the four countries.


Latinobarómetro Database.

This is a slight divergence from Easton’s original use of the term, although it still has the same general meaning.

Although the question on satisfaction does not specify what is meant by “how democracy works,” this analysis assumes that it reflects satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions and particular authorities.

Latinobarómetro Database.

Latinobarómetro Database.

Although the limits of the methodology employed in this study make it impossible to test the specific causal connection proposed by the hypothesis (dissatisfaction → participation), the observation of correlation is sufficient.

Latinobarómetro Database.

Latinobarómetro Database.

Positive or negative perceptions of the economy have a potential influence on both satisfaction with government and preferred channels of voicing discontent.


Rioting was chosen because it was the more-radical of the extra-democratic activities, and thus less likely to have yielded a positive relationship when compared to occupying; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst, "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" 199.

Of course, this is a more minimalist definition of democracy. Civil liberties and the rule of law are also key elements.

Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst, "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" 201.

Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 256.
Bibliography


